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I. INTRODUCTION
The depravity that transpired at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq
propagated in the global media and left an indelible impression after
CBS 60 Minutes first displayed images of U.S. military police
abusing nude Iraqi prisoners. In April 2013, a nonpartisan panel
produced a six hundred page report that drew conclusions on the
abuse occurring during detentions and interrogation of alleged
terrorists and combatants in Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantinamo Bay,
and at other foreign sites.1 The report recognizes the significance of
the Abu Ghraib atrocities, but merges unassociated accounts2 and
ultimately concludes that the depictions in the notorious Abu Ghraib
photographs "were a function of undisciplined sadistic soldiers, not
policy."3 Agreeing with scholars who have eschewed the superficial
"bad apples" explanation,4 this article maintains that the panel's
interpretation does not scrupulously contextualize the Abu Ghraib
convictions and nurtures lingering agitation from the episode.
Referencing the misconduct at Abu Ghraib in testimony
before Congress, Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense during the
George W. Bush Administration, affirmed that individuals who
committed the abuses and those who "recommended the kind of
behavior" should "be brought to justice."5 The statement escapes
coherence because human rights groups, academics, and politicians
have emphasized that culpability should have been firmly affixed on
Rumsfeld and other top Bush Administration officials because they
issued orders that were akin to, or could have reasonably been
I THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT'S
TASK FORCE ON DETAINEE TREATMENT, passim (2013).
2 Id. at 7, 85-118 (stating that "the disclosure of atrocities at Abu Ghraib in 2004
and the ensuing condemnation both at home and abroad" altered the "aggressive-
ness of the detention policies").
3 Id. at 106.
4 See infra Part IV(D)(3).
Rumsfeld Testifies Before Senate Armed Services Committee, WASH. POST, May
7, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8575-
2004May7_2.html.
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expected to lead to the injustices portrayed in photographs and
video.6 Yet the only perpetrators brought to justice were low-level
soldiers; Army Reserve Spc. Charles Graner was sentenced to ten
years in prison, Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick to eight years,
Army Pfc. Lynndie England to three years, and nine other military
personnel received non-penal sanctions for their involvement.
Human Rights Watch highlighted that offenses, including
death, trauma, and various other human rights violations, routinely
occurred at Abu Ghraib and dozens of other facilities worldwide,
but the "only wrongdoers being brought to justice are those at the
bottom of the chain of command."s In July 2011, Human Rights
Watch contended that a real investigation should be conducted into
the role of those top officials "who authorized, ordered, and oversaw
torture and other serious violations of international law, as well as
those implicated as a matter of command responsibility, should be
investigated and prosecuted if evidence warrants." 9 In August 2012,
Amnesty International vehemently argued that it "is simply not good
enough" that President Obama came to office affirming that he
would "turn the page" on abuses perpetrated under the Bush Admin-
istration.10 Amnesty International declared: "The U.S. government is
required by international law to respect and ensure human rights ...
and to bring perpetrators to justice, no matter their level of office.""
6 Robert Bejesky, Pruning Non-Derogative Human Rights Violations into an
Ephemeral Shame Sanction, 58 LoY. L. REV. 821, 823-29 (2012) [hereinafter
Bejesky, Pruning]. See infra Parts II(D)(2)(3)(4).
7 Samuel Brenner, "I am a Bit Sickened": Examining Archetypes of Congressional
War Crimes Oversight After My Lai and Abu Ghraib, 205 MIL. L. REV. 1, 68
(2010).
8 PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING How GOOD PEOPLE
TURN EVIL 403-04 (2007).
9 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION AND MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES 3 (July 12, 2011), http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us07 11 webwcover_1.pdf.
10 Demand Accountability for Torture and Abuse, AMNESTY INT'L, http://www.
anmestyusa.org/our-work/issues/torture/accountability-for-torture; HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 1 (itemizing abuses, identifying several responsible Bush
Administration officials, and demanding accountability).
1 Demand Accountability, supra note 10.
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Pentagon reports cited dereliction of leadership as a cause of
systematic and rampant injustices committed in U.S. detention
facilities in Iraq, 12 but no investigation judiciously examined com-
mand responsibility of top officials. Stanford Psychology Profes-
sor Philip Zimbardo, a foremost authority on evaluating how
hierarchical acculturation can goad subordinates to transgress appro-
priate behavior and engage in immoral and criminal acts, served as
an expert witness for the defense during the Abu Ghraib criminal
trials and maintained that criminal indictments should have been
brought against senior military officers and officials in the Bush
White House. 14 Zimbardo underscored that the Bush Administration
commanded the interrogation system, ordered the policies down the
chain of command, and "isolate[d] the problem in order to deflect
attention and blame away from those at the top."15 Concurring,
Professor Ian Buruma wrote that "Lyndie England's character ... is
irrelevant" because it was the appointed legal advisers and the Bush
Administration that sought "ways to circumvent the Geneva
Conventions" and made torture permissible, which made England's
deeds possible. 16
The Abu Ghraib detention scandal is one piece of an encom-
passing pattern of interrogation crimes. This article does not assert
that no punishment of low-level troops was warranted, but maintains
that without investigating top officials in the Bush White House,
CIA, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and at least
12 Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power:
Interrogation, Detention, Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1271 (2005) (citing language
from Fay Report, Schlesinger Report, and Church Report).
13 Major Mynda G. Ohman, Integrating Title 18 War Crimes into Title 10: A
Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 57 A.F. L. REV. 1, 46
(2005).
14 ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at x-xiii.
15 Id. at 10.
16 Ian Buruma, Just Following Orders, FIN. TIMEs WEEKEND MAG., July 3, 2004,
at 24. See also Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 2085,
2134-35 (2005) (remarking that the MPs were part of a "group mentality that had
divided all into either 'good guys' or 'the enemy,"' which was even philosophic-
ally a reflection of the same policy set by the President as a war campaign of all
countries either lining up with "us" or "the terrorists.").
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including them as witnesses, the convictions and disciplinary
punishment imposed on low-level actors at Abu Ghraib could have
logically been expected to eventuate in a miscarriage of justice. Part
II addresses the abuse at Abu Ghraib, Part III considers the basis for
criminal liability of top officials, and Part IV assesses the unreason-
able result of solely convicting low-level soldiers.
II. IRAQI DETENTIONS
A. Dragnet Detentions During the Invasion and
Occupation of Iraq
After marketing peril for over six months,17 on March 19,
2003, President Bush ordered an attack on Iraq for supposedly
possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), having associa-
tions with al-Qaeda, and posing a security threat to Americans.
The invasion proceeded against the will of the international commu-
nity and without Security Council assent, 19 there were no WMDs or
20
relations with al-Qaeda, and the alleged basis for threats was an
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that was a product of
deductive reasoning and White House agenda-setting. 21 It was later
17 See Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War, 48
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 343, 348-49 (2012); Robert Bejesky, Public Diplomacy or
Propaganda? Targeted Messages and Tardy Corrections to Unverified Reported,
40 CAP. U. L. REV. 967-1052 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Public Diplomacy]. See
also Robert Bejesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy: Linking Al Queda and Iraq, 56
How. L.J. 1, 5-6 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, CFP].
" Robert Bejesky, Weapon Inspections Lessons Learned: Evidentiary Presump-
tions and Burdens of Proof 38 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 295, 350-56 (2011)
[hereinafter Bejesky, Weapon Inspections].
19 Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 18, at 345-50.
20 Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary Standards,
44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 811, 817, 842-43, 877 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Intelli-
gence Information].
21 See generally Robert Bejesky, The SSCI Investigation of the Iraq War: Part II:
Politicization of Intelligence, 40 S.U. L. REV. 243 (2013) (explaining flaws and
missing evidence in the SSCI's investigation); Robert Bejesky, SSCI Investigation
of the Iraq War: Part I: A Split Decision, 40 S.U. L. REV. 1 (2012) (summarizing
the SSCI's analysis).
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learned that the Bush Administration held National Security Council
meetings as early as February 2001 on the topic of displacing the
Iraqi government 22 and tasked military commanders with devel-
oping war plans starting in November 2001 while publicly denying
that there was any such war plan.23
Shortly after the invasion, the U.S. military seized the Abu
Ghraib prison, a massive incarceration facility.24 Detaining comba-
tants and suspected foes became a hallmark of the occupation. Two
months after the invasion, an estimated 12,000 Iraqis had been
arrested and were often confined for many months.25 Approximately
43,000 had been arrested and detained during the first year26 and
over 100,000 over the seven-year occupation.27 The number of
detainees fluctuated from 14,000 in 2005,28 15,000 in 2006,29
18,000 in 2007,30 21,000 in early August 2008,31 25,000 in October
22 Robert Bejesky, Politico-International Law, 57 LoY. L. REV. 29, 63-65 (2011)
[hereinafter Bejesky, Politico].
23 See BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 3-4, 30-31, 34-37, 40, 42, 55-59, 75-
79, 96-103, 120-25, 129-30, 137, 157-59, 188 (2004).24 ANTHONY ARNOVE, IRAQ: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL 23 (2006).
25 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 24 (2005), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/06/08/road-abu-ghraib. IN THE NAME OF
DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN WAR CRIMES IN IRAQ AND BEYOND 96-97 (Jeremy
Brecher, Jill Cutler, Brendan Smith, eds., 2005).
26 Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Scott Wilson, Mistreatment of Detainees Went Beyond
Guards' Abuse; Ex-Prisoners, Red Cross Cite Flawed Arrests, Denial of Rights,
WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at Al; Isabel Hilton, The 8001b Gorilla in American
Foreign Policy: Alleged Terror Suspects are Held Incommunicado All Over the
World, GUARDIAN, July 27, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
print/0,3858,4980261-103390,00.html (estimating that 12,000 prisoners were
being held in Iraq).
27 Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand
Perspectives from the Other War, 2003-2010, 51 VA. J. INT'LL. 549, 553 (2011).
28 See ALFRED W. McCoY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 124 (2006); IN THE NAME OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 96.
29 Alexander G. Higgins, UN Exec. Decries Illegal Iraq Detainees, Assoc. PRESS,
Apr. 21, 2006, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/
article/1 68/3748 1.html.
30 Walter Pincus, U.S. Holds 18,000 Detainees in Iraq, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,
2007, at A24.
108
The Abu Ghraib Convictions
2008,32 and 15,000 in December 2008. Detainees were reportedly
criminal suspects, terrorists, combatants, and "security detainees"
and many underwent interrogation procedures. 34
While tens of thousands of Iraqis were detained over a
several year period, after Iraqis captured several U.S. soldiers during
the invasion, Congress passed a resolution admonishing that "Iraqis
who are holding United States and British troops as prisoners could
potentially be eligible for prosecution under the War Crimes Act of
1996.",s The War Crimes Act criminalizes war crimeS36 perpetrated
by foreigners or any U.S. national in any location and can impose
fines, imprisonment, or the death penalty. Despite the War Crimes
Act's applicability to foreigners and U.S. nationals and announce-
ment to provide equitable treatment, it does not appear that there
was commensurate protection or punishment.39
31 John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: United
States Holds Large Numbers of Detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, 102 AM. J.INT'L.
L. 879, 879 (2008) (also holding 630 prisoners at Bagram air base in Afghanistan).
32 Catherine Powell, Essay: Scholars' Statement of Principles for the New
President on U.S. Detention Policy: An Agenda for Change, 47 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 339, 346 (2009); Alissa J. Rubin, A Puzzle over Prisoners as
Iraqis Takes Control, , N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 2008, at Al.
33 Captain Matthew Greig, Detention Operations in a Counterinsurgency: Pitfalls
and the Inevitable Transition, 2009 ARMY LAW 25, 29.
34 McCoY, supra note 28, at 124.
35 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 317.
36 A war crime is defined as a "grave breach" in applicable treaties, particularly the
Geneva Conventions, of which the U.S. is a member. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1)
(2006).
37 18 U.S.C. § 2441(1) (2006).
38 War Crimes Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2587 Before S. Comm. On
Immigration & Claims of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 12 (1996)
(statement of Michael J. Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal Advisor, Department
of State) ("We are certainly interested in bringing to justice those who commit war
crimes against our nationals and our armed forces personnel, but we also have an
interest in having the authority, if necessary, to prosecute any U.S. national or
armed forces members who commits such acts.") available at http://www.justice.
gov/jmd/1s/legislative histories/p 1104-192/hear-81-1996.pdf.
39 Douglas Jehl & Neil A. Lewis, The Reach of War: The Prisoners; U.S. Military
Disputed Protected Status of Prisoners Held in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004,
2013-14 109
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Evidence of human rights suffering emerged, but the Bush
Administration defended by maintaining that inconveniences were
legal and necessary because interrogation techniques were vital to
acquiring intelligence. 40 As for the feverish predilection to confine,
in February 2004, US military intelligence officers announced that
"between 70 percent and 90 percent of person deprived of their
liberty in Iraq had been arrested by mistake" 41 and were held
without legal redress.42 The Pentagon's Fay Report estimated that
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/world/reach-war-prisoners-us-military-
disputed-protected-status-prisoners-held-iraq.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
(noting that the Red Cross presented the U.S. military with a list of human rights
abuses at Abu Ghraib and the U.S. military stated "that many Iraqi prisoners were
not entitled to the full protections of the Geneva Conventions."). One military
detention supervisor remarked that "if you don't violate someone's human rights
some of the time, you probably aren't doing your job." Dana Priest & Barton
Gellman, US Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26,
2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/
AR2006060901356.html. Professor Marcy Strauss was curious whether this
sentiment was equivalent to a manager advising a CEO at a top multinational
corporation with a comment such as, "[i]f we're not discriminating against
employees on the basis of race, we're not doing our job." Marcy Strauss, The
Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269, 1282 (2005). Brigadier General
Janis L. Karpinski, the Military Police (MP) commander, was purportedly told by
her superior, Major General Walter Wodjakowski, "I don't care if we're holding
15,000 innocent people. We're winning the war." McCoY, supra note 28, at 142.
It is unclear how detainees could be of intelligence value or be guilty of
wrongdoing related to the rationales for war when all reasons persistently alleged
for attacking Iraq were spurious and ultimately false, the Security Council did not
sanction the invasion, and a notable percentage of scholars and countries called the
war illegal. Bejesky, CFP, supra note 17, at 2; Bejesky, Weapon Inspections,
supra note 18, at 350-51; Phillippe Sands, The Green Light, VANITY FAIR, May
2008 (remarking that interrogation "techniques are [only] legal if the motivation is
pure."), http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/05/guantanamo200805.
print.
40 ARNOVE, supra note 24, at 21-24; Priest & Gellman, supra note 39.
41 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) ON THE
TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER
PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST,
INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION (2004) [hereinafter ICRC, TREATMENT BY THE
COALITION FORCES], available at http://cryptome.org/icrc-report.htm.
42 Ash U. Bali, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-
Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 431, 468-69 (2005).
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between 85 to 90 percent of those detained at Abu Ghraib "were of
no intelligence value."43 Women and teenagers were detained.44 The
ICRC explained that those interned were arrested without cause and
"without knowing what they were accused of."45 A former CIA
intelligence officer objected to interrogation operations in Iraq and
stated: "No way. We signed up for the core program in Afghanistan
-pre-approved for operations against high-value targets-and now
you want to use it on cabdrivers, brothers-in-law, and people pulled
off the streets."46
B. Legal Authority to Detain
1. During War and Official Occupation
Under international law, the legal authority to detain adver-
saries varies between a war period and an occupation phase. The
invasion of Iraq was an inter-state conflict, which means the Third
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
permitted detaining POWs. 47 Combatants, or those who take up
43 MASTER GENERAL GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU
GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 37,
Aug., 23, 2004, available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
dod/fay82504rpt.pdf [hereinafter Fay Report].
44 Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER (May 10, 2004),
http://www.newyorker.conarchive/2004/05/10/040510fa fact.
45 ICRC, TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES, supra note 41; Richard Norton-
Taylor, US Sweep of Arrests After Iraq Invasion Leads to Few Convictions,
GUARDIAN, Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/nov/15/iraq.
usa (noting that from US Central Command numbers, from the invasion in March
2003, 35,000 Iraqis had been detained, 1,300 had been charged with crimes, and
half of those charged had been found guilty).
46 MCCoY, supra note 28, at 133; MATTHEw GUTMANAN & CATHERINE LUTZ,
BREAKING RANKS: IRAQ VETERANS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE WAR 112-13 (2010)
(noting how veterans were dismayed about how interrogation was being
conducted on people who were in the wrong place and the wrong time).
47 Chesney, supra note 27, at 559-60. See Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 3, 4, 42, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva I] (permitting deprivation of civilian liberties if
"the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.").
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arms, can be detained until hostilities cease, and a civilian may only
be held for as long as the individual detention is absolutely neces-
sary to ensure security for the situation giving rise to the detention.48
Anyone other than a "combatant" is by default a civilian.49
On May 1, 2003, Bush provided a "Mission Accomplished"
speech on the USS Abraham Lincoln, which military officials later
observed was calculated to convert the status of Iraqis from being
held as POWs during war to civilians or insurgents during occupa-
tion,50 which ostensibly also imparts a heightened legitimacy with a
victor-occupier right to control. Consequently, the Fourth Article of
the Geneva Convention explicitly countenances extended detentions
for individuals posing a threat to governing authorities.5 1 Article 42
of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War5permits detaining individuals "for
imperative reasons of security." A "protected person" includes
enemy nationals and the entire population of the occupied
48 Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 403, 404-05 (2009); Alec Walen & Ingo Venzke, Detention in the
"War on Terror": Constitutional Interpretation Informed by the Law of War, 14
TLSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45, 65-66 (2007).
49 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, art. 50(1), (June 8,
1977), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I]; INTL. COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTION OF 1949, at 611 P 1917 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 1987)
50 R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Gave Intelligence Bigger Role, WASH. POST, May 21,
2004, at A17; Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J.
NAT'L SEC L. & POL'Y 343, 345 (2010) (noting that "[m]any important human
rights protections may be relaxed or derogated from in the exigencies of armed
conflicted" and that this "shift from the law that prevails during peace occurs only
when armed conflict begins.").
51 See Geneva I, supra note 47, at art. 4.
52 Chesney, supra note 27, at 559-60. See Geneva I, supra note 47, at arts. 3, 4, 42
(permitting deprivation of civilian liberties if "the security of the Detaining Power
makes it absolutely necessary.").
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territories.53 While these agreements prevail as lex specialis, human
rights treaties might also apply.5 4
Human rights laws forbid individuals from being confined
for capricious, illegal, unjust or inappropriate reasons,55 and the
United Nations Secretary-General's Compilation of General Com-
ments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Bodies recently affirmed that situations of preventive administrative
detention must not be arbitrary, must adhere to legal procedures, and
must designate reasons for incarceration.56 Consistent with concep-
tions of robust human rights guarantees, the Coalition Provisional
Authority purportedly went so far as to afford Miranda-like war-
nings, including the right to remain silent, avoid self-incriminations,
and assure that violations of those rights could not be introduced
into criminal proceedings.57 These rights should have reduced the
number of innocent people who were detained and precluded the use
of interrogations, but tergiversation presumably bided over the
applicability of criminal law and occupation-based detention.
53 Oscar M. Uhler et al., COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE PRISONERS OF WAR 46 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Intl. Comm. Red Cross 1958).
54 Jochen Frowein, The Relationship Between Human Rights Regimes and
Regimes of Belligerent Occupation, 28 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1, 16 (1998) (noting
that "international humanitarian law takes precedence over human rights treaties
as lex specialis in so far as it may constitute a special justification in armed
conflict for interference with rights protected under human rights treaties.").
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(1), Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; UN Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No.
1085/2002, para. 8.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1085/2002 (2006).
56 The Secretary-General, Compilation of General Comments and General Recom-
mendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/
Rev.9 (Vol. I), at 234 (May 27, 2008), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.
nsf/0/cal2c3a4ea8d6c53cl256d500056e56fOpendocument.
57 John C. Williamson, Establishing Rule of Law in Post-War Iraq: Rebuilding the
Justice System, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229, 239-40 (2004). See L. Paul
Bremer, Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 3,
Criminal Procedures (June 18, 2003), at §§ 4, 6 (purportedly granting Iraqis an
absolute right to remain silent from time that they were arrested).
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2. Occupation Authority After Iraqi
Governance
While the "war" had figuratively ended, a hybrid reality
straddled war and occupation and eventually engendered dubiety
over whether Iraqis or occupation security forces were principally
responsible for legally detaining insurgents and miscreants. Shortly
after Bush's "Mission Accomplished" speech declared that the war
was over, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the general of US
ground forces, announced to reporters that the "war has not ended"
and that violence was attributable to insurgencies against US forces
and not criminal acts. From Supreme Court precedent that affirms
a war can officially end by events, such as a Congressional act,
consummation of a treaty, or another political act,59 the President
arguably provided an informal and equivocal assertion about the
war's end.60
Insurgent attacks on American troops intensified and
61occurred with more regularity as time passed. With intensified
internal conflict, the occupation-appointed Iraqi government
5 MICHAEL ISIKOFF & DAVID CORN, HUBRIS: THE INSIDE STORY OF SPIN,
SCANDAL, AND SELLING OF THE IRAQ WAR 226 (2006).
59 Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 230 (1959); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948);
Wood v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); Fleming v. Mohawk
Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947).
60 Moreover, the use of detention status derived from a period of "war" had not
entirely been relegated because former President Saddam Hussein was captured in
December 2003, and the U.S. afforded Hussein with POW status. Srividhya
Ragavan & Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The Status of Detainees from the Iraq and
Afghanistan Conflicts, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 619, 656 (2005); Douglas Jehl, The
Struggle for Iraq: Captive; Hussein Given P.O. W. Status; Access Sought, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 10, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/10/world/the-struggle-for-
iraq-captive-hussein-given-pow-status-access-sought.html (Pentagon spokesman
noting that Hussein "is an enemy prisoner of war, and he'll continue to be an
enemy prisoner of war unless and until his status is determined to be otherwise.").
61 ISIKOFF & CORN, supra note 58, at 213, 226; Noah Feldman, Better Sixty Years
of Tyranny Than One Night ofAnarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 143,
145 (2009) (noting the distinction between the formal matter under international
law of not being the occupier and the reality of remaining as an occupier).
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requested the U.S. military to remain as an occupier-intervener 62
even though the formalities were questionable because the Iraqi
officials were not elected, had minimal control over Iraqi territory,
and were dependent on or perhaps even beholden to the occupying
Military.63
In short, war, occupation, and an occupation-subordinate
role applied to U.S. forces as the occupation progressed, which
derivatively governed detainee treatment. If Geneva Convention
POW status applies to combatants, Article 17 prohibits POWs from
being interrogated.64 If occupation law applies or the Iraqi govern-
ment is responsible for detention and enforcing punishment on
detainees, the US military and the Iraqi government are both
mandated to respect human rights law and humanitarian law for
territory under their control, despite stages or labels of conflict.65
The period of the Abu Ghraib atrocities was after the President
stated that the war was over; after Security Council Resolutions
called the U.S. and U.K. "occupiers," who were required to apply
international humanitarian law in that status; after the U.S.-led
Coalition Provision Authority was installed; and after an initial Iraqi
62 S.C. Res. 1546, annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 5, 2004).
63 Bejesky, Public Diplomacy, supra note 17, at 1037-41 (explaining the domi-
nance of occupational authorities in the media to support continued occupation);
Eliav Lieblich, Intervention and Consent: Consensual Forcible Interventions in
Internal Armed Conflicts as International Agreements, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 337, 341
(2011).
64 Geneva I, supra note 47, art. 17.
65 Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding
Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to
Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345, 345 (2007) ("Whether they
constitute 'torture' or 'violence to life and person,' it is quite clear that the tactics
portrayed in photos from Abu Ghraib Prison, namely the stripping naked and
hooding of persons for interrogation purposes and the use of dogs for interrogation
and terroristic purposes, are patently illegal interrogation tactics. Such treatment
violates the explicit rights of detainees of any status covered by various treaty
based and customary international legal prohibitions of cruel, inhuman, degrading,
and humiliating treatment, physical coercion, threats of violence, measures of
intimidation, and terrorism during any armed conflict and regardless of purpose or
feigned excuses on the basis of reciprocity, reprisals, or alleged necessity.").
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66Governing Council was appointed. The remainder of the article
explains why, despite the possible combinations of governing law,
the U.S. soldiers convicted of abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison should
likely not have been the most criminally culpable.
C. The Abuse at Abu Ghraib
1. The Event
Earlier leaks of detainee abuse in Iraq did not quell the
bombshell impact of the imagery of injustices that 60 Minutes
67initiated on April 28, 2004. Photographs displayed naked prisoners
being paraded around with their heads' covered with sandbags
bearing small holes that could dangerously inhibit breathing.68
Soldiers laughed and exhibited "thumbs up" gestures as they
hovered over detainees69 layered in a pyramid to be "smoked,"
which was the commonly-used term for subjecting prisoners to
muscle fatigue so that they would pass out.70 Hayder Sabber Abd
stated that "he and six other inmates were beaten, stripped naked"
and "forced to pile on top of one another, to straddle one another's
66 S.C. Res. 1500, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500 (Aug. 14, 2003); S.C. Res. 1483,
Preface, P5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) (calling the U.S. and Britain
the occupying authority and requiring all parties to comply with the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907).
67 McCoY, supra note 28, at 144.
68 Id. at 59; David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1425, 1431 (2005) ("As anyone who has ever come close to drowning or
suffocating knows, the oxygen-starved brain sends panic signals that overwhelm
everything else.").6 9 PETER IRONS, WAR POWERS 252 (2005).
70 SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND 13 (2004) (accounting how
prisoners were hooded and the military soldiers would "drive them around the
camp in a Humvee, making turns so they didn't know where they were .... I
wasn't trying to get information I was just having a little fun"); Eric Schmitt, 3 in
82nd Airborne Say Beating Iraqi Prisoners Was Routine, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 24,
2005, at Al (service members further noting that "soldiers in their battalion in Iraq
routinely beat and abused prisoners in 2003 and 2004 to help gather intelligence
on the insurgency and to amuse themselves.").
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backs naked, to simulate oral sex."71 Other photographs depicted a
female soldier gaily leading a hooded and naked detainee with a dog
chain around his neck, and inmates covered in human feces. 72 A
hooded prisoner stood on a box with wires attached to his "fingers,
toes, and penis" because he was informed that he would be electro-
cuted if he stepped off of the box.7 3
The Department of Defense commissioned U.S. Army
Major General Antonio M. Taguba, the acting director of the army
staff during the Iraq War under General Eric K. Shinseki, to investi-
gate the crimes depicted in the Abu Ghraib prison photographs. 74
The investigation documented that the "systemic," "intentionally
perpetrated," "sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" were
perpetrated between October and December 2003.75 Soldiers threat-
ened detainees with guns and military dogs (that even bit detainees),
beat prisoners, "broke chemical lights and poured the phosphoric
liquid on detainees," "sodomized [a prisoner] with a broomstick and
chemical light, poured freezing water on naked detainees, [and]
videotaped and photographed detainees" while they were forced into
"sexually explicit positions."76 Prisoners were exposed to extreme
71 lan Fisher, Iraqi Recounts Hours of Abuse by US Troops, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2004, at Al (quoting Mr. Abd) ("[W]e did not think we would survive. All of us
believed we would be killed and not get out alive.").
72 WILLIAM A. SHERDEN, BEST LAID PLANS: THE TYRANNY OF UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES AND How To AVOID THEM 135 (2011); Rebecca Leung, Abuse of
Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed, CBS NEWS, May 6, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.con
2100-500164_162-614063.html; David Stout, More Abu Ghraib Pictures
Broadcast on Australian TV, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, http://travel.nytimes.
com/2006/02/16/international/middleeast/16abuse.html.
73 MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 17 (May 4, 2004), http://www.npr.org/iraq/
2004/prison abuse report.pdf [hereinafter Taguba Report]; Amann, supra note
16, at 2091; Ralph Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"? Extraterritorial State Action and
International Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 739,
762 (2005) (noting Darius Rejali, an expert on torture, notes that the methods are
"standard torture [in democracies]").
74 Taguba Report, supra note 73.
75 Id. at 16.
76 Id. at 16-17; LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTHONY R. JONES, AR 15-6 INVESTIGA-
TION OF THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE
2013-14 117
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vol. XXXII
heat and cold, subjected to "believed-drowning situations," deprived
of sleep for many days, kept naked for several days at a time,77 and
subjected to mock executions, burning, and electric shock.7 1 Profes-
sor of Medicine Steven Miles surveyed the potentially devastating
psychological impact. Miles cited sworn statements and interviews
describing "beatings, burns, shocks, bodily suspensions, asphyxia,
threats against detainees and their relatives, sexual humiliation,
isolation, prolonged hooding and shackling, and exposure to heat,
cold and loud noise." 79
The Military Police (MPs) did not hide the perversions.
Graphic photos were used as computer screen savers in the
interrogation room, and soldiers cognizant of the tactics remained
silentso and others considered the practices a routine recreational
game. Republican Senator James Inhofe placed attention on the
detainees and noted: "These prisoners, you know they're not there
for traffic violations. If they're in Cellblock 1-A or 1-B, these
9-10 (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
nationi/documents/fay-report_8-25-04.pdf [hereinafter Jones Report].
77 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 74-76, 85; Fay Report, supra
note 43, at 57, 63-64, 68.
78 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 110; ZIMBARDO, supra note 8,
at 357; Laura A. Dickinson, Filartiga's Legacy in an Era of Military Privatization,
37 RUTGERS L.J. 703, 705 (2006) (citing several official Pentagon investigations
that listed methods that might be torture).
79 US Army Medics Accused in Abuse, BBC, Aug. 20, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/health/3579792.stm.
80 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 98-99; Kate Zernike, Only a
Few Spoke Up on Abuse as Many Soldiers Stayed Silent, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/22/world/reach-war-witnesses-only-few-
spoke-up-abuse-many-soldiers-stayed-silent.html.
81 PHILIP GOUREVITCH & ERROL MORRIS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 165
(2008) (calling abuses just standard procedure). Private Lynndie England, who can
be seen enthusiastically participating in the photos, explained that it was "just fun
and games." ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 329. Other soldiers abused prisoners as a
way to "work out your frustrations." Id. at 368-69. Karpinski stated that the
soldiers were "thoroughly enjoying all of this sport..." Major General Antonio M.
Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation Interview of Brigadier General Janis L.
Karpinski, Feb. 15, 2004, available at http://www.scvhistory.conscvhistory/
signal/iraq/reports/TAG45-karpinski.pdf.
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prisoners, they're murderers, they're terrorists, they're insurgents." 82
It was later revealed that there were specific orders related to the
abuse, but that was not the impression characterized by top govern-
ment officials.
D. Chain of Command at Abu Ghraib
1. A Warned But Still "Shocked"
Administration
After the notorious CBS 60 Minutes story broke, top
officials in the Bush administration and the Pentagon relegated cul-
pability for human rights violations to the lowest levels of the
military hierarchy. Policymakers asserted that misguided reservists
committed isolated indiscretions, and they also concomitantly justi-
fied that intense interrogation pressure methods were needed to
acquire intelligence information8 3 while abstaining from allusions
that the vivid misconduct could have been associated with
interrogations. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced that he
was "visibly perturbed" by the soldiers84 and their sadistic and
inhumane photographs.8 5 President Bush pledged to raze Abu
82 ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 328; Sean D. Murphy, Executive Branch
Memoranda on Status and Permissible Treatment of Detainees, 98 AM .J. INT'L L.
820, 820 (2004) (government noting that harsher interrogations were authorized
for detainees who had "migrated" to Iraq).
83 ARNOVE, supra note 24, at 23; McCoY, supra note 28, at 152; IN THE NAME OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 2, 8, 84; David Paul Kuhn, Damage Control on
Abu Ghraib, CBS NEWS, May 5, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.constories/2004/05/
05/politics/main615811.shtml. Senator Lindsey Graham stated that this was not
about humiliation but about "rape and murder." Rumsfeld Warns of Worse to
Come, ASSOCIATED. PRESS, May 8, 2004, available at http://www.foxnews.coni
story/0,2933,119374,00.html.
84 Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow "War": FOIA, The Abuses of
Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1141, 1187 (2007).
85 Rumsfeld: Unreleased images 'cruel and inhuman', CNN, (May 8, 2004, 8:47
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/05/07/iraq.abuse.main/index.
html; McCoY, supra note 28, at 133 ("[S]enior CIA officials were recoiled from
abuses at Abu Ghraib").
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Ghraib and erect a "modern maximum security prison" because Abu
Ghraib was a "symbol of disgraceful conduct by a few American
troops who dishonored our country and dishonored our values." 86
It is true that the Bush Administration did not endorse most
of these acts or the deviant intent underlying the crimes, but
incredulity was peculiar because there were plentiful warnings of
analogous offenses and top officials not only sanctioned but even
directed interrogation methods that included humiliating detainees,
hooding and stripping prisoners naked, and using stress positions
and sensory deprivation.87 Similar to Afghanistan, where detainees
were excluded from Geneva Convention protections by way of
several legal arguments that labeled them "unlawful combatants,"88
top officials also maintained that many Iraqis were not entitled to
protections under the Geneva Conventions89 even though every Iraqi
detained should be a "protected person" covered by the Geneva
Conventions.90 Moreover, interrogation immoralities became a
86 McCoy, supra note 28, at 146. Demolishing the prison might mean that US
private contractors could build a new facility at the expense of US taxpayers
and/or would be another item that would put Iraqis into deeper debt. Robert
Bejesky, Currency Cooperation and Sovereign Financial Obligations, 24 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 91, 101-03 (2012). The prison was not demolished because an Army
judge held that the prison had to be preserved as a "crime scene." McCoY, supra
note 28, at 146.
87 Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International
Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 811, 843-44 (2005).
8 Robert Bejesky, How the Commander in Chiefs "Call for Papers" Veils a Path
Dependent Result of Torture, 40 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. (forthcoming Fall
2013) [hereinafter Call for Papers].
89 Douglas Jehl & Neil A. Lewis, The Reach of War: The Prisoners; U.S. Disputed
Protection Status of Iraq Inmates, N.Y. TIMEs, May 23, 2004. The Geneva
Conventions and POW protections distinctly applied in Iraq Victor Hansen, A
Response to the Perceived Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, 50 S. TEx. L. REV.
617, 650-52 (2009) (noting that John Yoo and others had suggested that laws of
war changed after 9/11, but an alternative position is that there is no difference
between the war in Iraq, the Vietnam War, or conflict envisioned by the Geneva
Conventions, and the string of cases handed down by the Supreme Court that
overturned Yoo's advice, simply affirms that).
90 David E. Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and
Detainees, 37 GEO. J. INT'LL. 61, 82-83 (2005).
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standard practice across detention facilities and still continued after
the scandal, frequently with the approval of superior officers,91 but
the Abu Ghraib offenses became vividly familiar because soldiers
filmed them.
Notice of this breed of harm was available before the publi-
cized events at Abu Ghraib occurred. There were general warnings
in that abusive actions had been occurring in other foreign incarcera-
tion facilities outside of Iraq for nearly two years before the Abu
Ghraib photos were revealed,92 but admonitions were more specific.
91 ARNOVE, supra note 24, at 22, 27. Human Rights Watch, Leadership Failure:
Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by the US Army's 82 d Airborne
Division, 16-18, vol. 17(3)(G), Sept. 2005, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/
us0905/us0905.pdf (noting that superior officers did not provide a meaningful
response regarding applying restrictions of the Geneva Conventions to the interro-
gation programs). This was not the spirit of publicized laws. On March 8, before
the photos were released, the Coalition Provision Authority adopted an interim
Administrative Law which stated: "Torture in all its forms, physical or mental,
shall be prohibited under all circumstances, as shall be cruel, inhuman, or degra-
ding treatment. No confession made under compulsion, torture, or threat thereof
shall be relied upon or admitted into evidence for any reason in any proceeding,
whether criminal or otherwise." Iraq's Transitional Administrative Law, WASH.
POST, MARCH 8, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39825-
2004Mar8 2.html.
92 David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 49,
59 (2006). Reports revealed that as early as January 2002, detainees at Bagram
Prison in Afghanistan were held naked with bags covering their heads, that they
were photographed while surrounded by approximately a dozen MPs wielding
bats and guns, and that they were forced to squat and remain in uncomfortable
positions for extended durations. David Rose, They Tied Me Up Like a Beast and
Began Kicking Me, GUARDIAN, May 16, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2004/may/16/terrorism.guantanamo; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDURING
FREEDOM: ABUSES BY US FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN 24-25 (2004), http://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistanO304.pdf (reporting that prisoners
were stripped naked at Bagram prison as early as May 2002); Suzanne Goldenberg
& James Meek, Papers Reveal Bagram Abuse, GUARDIAN, Feb. 18, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/feb/18/usa.iraq (stating that "[n]ew evi-
dence has emerged that US forces in Afghanistan engaged in widespread Abu
Ghraib-style abuse, taking 'trophy photographs' of detainees and carrying out rape
and sexual humiliation."); Carlotta Gall & David Rohde, New Charges Raise
Questions on Abuse at Afghan Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, http://www.
nytimes.com/2004/09/17/international/asia/17afghan.html?_r=0 (stating that mili-
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Starting shortly after the invasion and throughout 2003, the Intema-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) periodically informed
the Bush Administration and U.S. military command of arrests
without cause, the use of excessive force, and physical and
emotional coercion during interrogations. 93 In July 2003, Amnesty
International produced a memorandum for the U.S. government that
documented reports on arrests without cause, allegations of torture
and ill treatment of prisoners in Iraq, and even deaths of detainees.94
Specific to the issues in question, in October 2003, the ICRC
expressed outrage to coalition authorities when it visited Abu
Ghraib and found prisoners "completely naked in totally empty
concrete cells and in total darkness" for several days. 95 The ICRC
concluded that top Bush Administration officials had knowledge of
analogous violations sometime between March and November
tary investigations confirmed that "Interrogation techniques intended only for
Guantinamo came to be used in Afghanistan and Iraq ... [T]echniques included
removal of clothing"); Kathy Gannon, Prisoners Released From Bagram Say
Forced to Strip Naked, Deprived of Sleep, Ordered to Stand for Hours, Assoc.
PREss, March 14, 2003.
93 ICRC, TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES, supra note 41; Abuse Scandal
Focus Shifts to Bush Legal Memo, Assoc. PRESS, May 16, 2004, http://www.
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,120072,00.htnl (stating that "Secretary of State Powell
says there were high-level discussions within the Bush administration last fall
about information from the International Committee of the Red Cross alleging
inmate abuse at the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.").
94 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAQ: MEMORANDUM ON CONCERNS RELATING TO
LAW AND ORDER 6, 11, 13 (JULY 2003), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
MDE14/157/2003/en/968002d6-d6bl-11 dd-ab95-al3b602cO642/mdel41572003
en.pdf.
95 Neil A. Lewis, The Struggle for Iraq: Inspectors; Red Cross Found Abuses at
Abu Ghraib Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, http://www.nytimes.
com/2004/05/1 1/world/the-struggle-for-iraq-inspectors-red-cross-found-abuses-at-
abu-ghraib-last-year.html (further noting that there were "acts of humiliation such
as being made to stand naked against the wall of the cell with arms raised or with
women's underwear over the heads for prolonged periods" and that military intel-
ligence officers confirmed that "methods of physical and psychological coercion
used by the interrogators appeared to be part of the standard operating procedures
by military intelligence personnel to obtain confessions and extract information.").
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2003.96 Secretary of State Powell certified that "we kept the presi-
dent informed of the concerns that were raised by the ICRC and
other international organizations as part of my regular briefings of
the president." 97
2. General Orders for Interrogation
Following the 60 Minutes broadcast, the media gradually
leaked secret memos indicating that orders to engage in disturbing
interrogation techniques, such as those used at Abu Ghraib, came
from the highest levels of government.98 In October 2002, which
was more than one year before the crimes at Abu Ghraib occurred,
Joint Task Force 170 imparted the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
SOUTHCOM with proposals to use three categories of progres-
sively intensive interrogation tactics. Category I commissioned
interrogators to impose an uncomfortable environment, including by
yelling and employing deception to inflict stressful conditions on
detainees. 99 Category II permitted interrogators to employ stress
96 Monica Hakimi, The Media as Participants in the International Legal Process,
16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 5 (2006).
97 Mark Matthews, Powell says Bush was 'informed' of Red Cross concerns,
BALT. SUN, May 12, 2004, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bal-te.powelll2
mayl2,0,2608695.story; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAQ: ONE YEAR ON THE
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION REMAINS DIRE 3, 10-11, Mar. 18, 2004, http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2004/en/abbl2f40-d601-11 dd-bb24-
Ifb85fe8fa05/mde140062004en.pdf (reporting that Coalition Forces "have shot
Iraqis dead during demonstrations" and "tortured and ill-treated prisoners and
detainees," and that there were reports of Iraqis being tortured starting in April
2003.).
98 McCoY, supra note 28, at 144. Larry Wilkerson, chief of staff to Secretary of
State Powell, explained that the secretary of defense and the vice president initially
authorized interrogation procedures for the armed forces that "were not in accor-
dance with the spirit of the Geneva Conventions and the laws of war." Paust,
supra note 65, at 350.
99 William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, For: Secretary
of Defense, Subject: Counter-Resistance Techniques, Nov. 27, 2002, available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation-and-plans/Detainee/additional detainee d
ocuments/07-F-2406%20doc%201.pdf; Task Force 170, Dep't of Def., Request
for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies 1, Oct. 11, 2002, http://www.dod.
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positions, mislead detainees with falsified documents, quarantine
captives in solitary confinement for up to thirty days, constrict
breathing, induce sensory deprivation, and invoke phobias.100 Cate-
gory III authorized interrogators to threaten to kill members of a
captive's family, expose inmates to harshly cold temperatures and
water, engage in daylong interrogations, and induce perceptions of
drowning and suffocation. 101 In December 2002, Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld approved Category I and II, and some methods in
Category III.102
After some officials contended that detainees frequently
resisted approved interrogation methods, a Defense Working Group
was established in early-March 2003, and Rumsfeld authorized
another dozen interrogation methods, which included implementing
"environmental manipulation" methods, altering sleep rhythms from
night to day, leaving detainees isolated and naked in the dark for up
to thirty days, applying harsh heat and cold, withholding food,
hooding for several days straight, and forcing detainees into "stress
positions" to "subject detainees to rising levels of pain." 0 3 These
methods did not spontaneously emerge, but, instead, were author-
ized by top officials, progressed down the chain of command, and
were substantially consistent with the CIA's interrogation tactics
that were set forth in the Kubark Interrogation Manual (1963).104
mil/pubs/foi/operation-and-plans/Detainee/additional detainee documents/07-F-
2406%20doc%201.pdf.
100 Task Force 170, supra note 99, at 1-2.
101 Id. at 2-3.
102 Evan J. Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to Deny Application
of the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the
Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. 541, 583,
593-94 (2005); Paust, supra note 87, at 840. The Bush Administration approved
the use of sensory deprivation, stress positions, phobias and dogs, psychological
trickery, and threat scenarios against the detainee and/or his family. Haynes, supra
note 99.
103 Alfred W. McCoy, The Outcast of Camp Echo: The Punishment of David
Hicks, THE MONTHLY, June 2006, http://www.themonthly.com.au/punishment-
david-hicks-outcast-camp-echo-alfred-w-mccoy-229.
10 Wallach, supra note 102, at 581. For example, the CIA's Kubark Interrogation
manual states that "whereas pain inflicted on a person from outside himself may
actually focus or intensify the will to resist, his resistance is likelier to be sapped
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At Senate Armed Service Committee hearings, Senator
Levin itemized interrogation methods approved by the Secretary of
Defense for "unlawful combatants," which included "nudity,
exploiting detainees' fears ... and stress positions" in December
2002; additional interrogation methods authorized on April 16,
2003; General Miller's involvement when visiting Iraq; a document
for Iraq "titled 'Policy No. 1-Battlefield Interrogation Team and
Facility (BIT/F) Policy' dated 15 July 2003;" and queried General
Fay who admitted that these authorizations "contribute[d] to the use
at Abu Ghraib of aggressive interrogation techniques." Without
these extraordinary orders, the military would have followed Field
Manual 34-52 and provided an exceptionally higher standard of
treatment for detainees.1 06
by pain which he seems to inflict on himself." McCoy, supra note 28, at 51-52, 91
(citing CIA, KUBARK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 88, 90, 94) (the
"immediate source of pain is not the interrogator but the victim himself."); CIA,
HUMAN RESOURCE EXPLOITATION TRAINING MANUAL-1983, http://www.
scribd.com/doc/80161998/Human-Resource-Exploitation-Training-Manual-1983)
(stating that "[i]ntense pain is quite likely to produce false confessions, fabricated
to avoid punishment," which results in a time-consuming delay while an investiga-
tion is conducted and the admissions are proven untrue."). However, forcing
detainees to remain in "stress positions" for prolonged durations can make the
victim feel responsible because the detainee's muscles are creating the pain.
McCoY, supra note 28, at 55; European Court of Human Rights, Ireland v. The
United Kingdom, No. 5310/17, January 18, 1978, 96-97, available at
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1978/1.html (holding psychological
interrogation methods illegal).
105 Committee on Armed Services, United States Congress, Review of Department
of Defense Detention and Interrogation Operations, S Hrg. 108-868, Sept. 9, 2004,
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg96600/html/CHRG-
108shrg96600.htm; John Barry, Michael Hirsch, & Michael Isikoff, The Roots of
Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 23, 2004, available at http://www.thedailybeast.
connewsweek/2004/05/23/the-roots-of-torture.html (stating that a "NEWSWEEK
investigation shows that, as a means of pre-empting a repeat of 9/11, Bush, along
with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Attorney General John Ashcroft, signed off
on a secret system of detention and interrogation that opened the door to such
[brutal methods as were seen in the Abu Ghraib photos]").
106 GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 81, at 39. The Department of Defense
remarked about interrogation procedures: "[O]ur Armed Forces are trained to a
standard of interrogation that reflects a tradition of restraint." Memorandum from
William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dep't of Def, to Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y
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In Administration of Torture: A Documentary Record from
Washington to Abu Ghraib and Beyond (2007), ACLU attorneys
Jameel Jaffer and Singh, asserted: "The fact that the Abu Ghraib
photographs depicted abuse at a single prison allowed senior admi-
nistration officials to claim, as they did repeatedly, that the abuse
was confined to that facility. This claim is completely false."107 FBI
reports, human rights groups, and witnesses confirmed that Abu
Ghraib-like atrocities were being committed at Guantinamo Bay as
early as November 2002,108 which was shortly after top officials
sanctioned oppressive interrogation approaches.
Lt. Gen. Randall Schmidt investigated abuses at Guanti-
namo Bay and stated: "For lack of a camera, you could have seen in
Guantinamo what was seen at Abu Ghraib." 109 The Pentagon's Fay
of Def. (Nov. 27, 2002); Robert Bejesky, The Utilitarian Rational Choice of
Interrogation from Historical Perspective 58 WAYNE L. REV. 327, 386-90, 401-02
(2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice] (pointing out abuse with
Operation Phoenix during the Vietnam War, training of Latin American security
forces at the School of the Americas, and other potential Pentagon involvement in
Latin America).
107 ACLU, ACLU Announces Publication of Administration of Torture, a
Groundbreaking Account of Prisoner Abuse in US Custody Abroad, BLOG OF
RIGHTs (Oct. 22, 2007), available at https://www.aclu.org/organization-news-and-
highlights/aclu-announces-publication-iadministration-torturei-groundbreaking-.
The denials of abuse were "completely false, and senior officials almost certainly
knew it to be so." Id.
10 Edward Alden, FBI Saw Abu Graib-style tactics in Guantanamo Bay jail, FIN.
TIMEs, (Dec. 7, 2004, 12:36 AM) available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
03c795c2-47e7-1 1d9-a0fd-00000e251 1c8.html#axzz2MQXJVAaV; FBI,
Detainee Interviews: Abusive Interrogation Issues, May 6, 2004, available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/FBI_4194.pdf (stating that "[i]n late
2002 and continuing into mid-2003, the Behavioral Analysis Unit raised concerns
over interrogation tactics being employed by the U.S. military," and affirming that
the FBI objected to the these methods, which were approved by the military and
government); Suzanne Goldenberg, Tania Branigan & Vikram Dodd, Guanta-
namo abuse same as Abu Ghraib, say Britons, THE GUARDIAN, (May 14, 2004,
10:04 PM), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/may/14/iraq.
guantanamo.
109 Seymour M. Hersh, The General's Report, THE NEW YORKER, (June 25, 2007),
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/06/25/070625fa-fact
hersh?currentPage=all.
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Report itemized instances that demonstrate keeping prisoners naked
in their cells and abusing them while they were naked was a stan-
dard practice. 110 Sexual humiliation for psychological effect may
have been systematically incorporated into interrogation tactics at
Guantinamo Bay and Afghanistan. il In November 2002, Rumsfeld
approved of the use of attack dogs to intimidate prisoners in
generate phobias, and this was implemented at Guantinamo Bay,
Afghanistan, and Abu Ghraib. 112
The Bush Administration approved of outrageous interroga-
tion methods and detainees were subjected to human rights abuses
even though Article 17 of the Geneva Convention explicitly states
that "every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is
bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth,
and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this,
110 Fay Report, supra note 43, at 88 (noting that military intelligence employed
removal of clothing as an "'ego down' technique" and by MPs "as a 'control'
mechanism"); ICRC, TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES, supra note 41
(stating that "methods of ill-treatment most frequently alleged ... included [b]eing
stripped naked for several days while held in solitary confinement..."); ACLU,
supra note 107 (reporting of the numerous homicides of detainees in U.S. deten-
tion facilities and that there were numerous reports of prisoners being stripped
naked); Scott Higham & Joe Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge,
WASH. POST, (May 21, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2004/05/21/AR2005040207076.html; Scott Higham & Joe
Stephens, Punishment and Amusement, WASH. POST, May 22, 2004, at AO1.
1 Seymour M. Hersh, The Gray Zone: How a secret Pentagon program came to
Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, (May 24, 2004), available at
http://www.newyorker.coniarchive/2004/05/24/040524fa-fact (noting that the use
of sexual humiliation as an interrogation strategy apparently came from a book by
Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind, in which he asserts that cultural values and rules
about sexual behavior are much more conservative and strict in the Arab world);
McCoY, supra note 28, at 126-27 (stating that after Rumsfeld appointed Miller, he
created a Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) with psychologists and
psychiatrists to "engineer the camp experiences of 'priority' detainees to make
interrogation more productive.").
112 Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition
Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 309, 340 (2006); Pearlstein,
supra note 12, at 1259, 1263-65 (citing Lt. GEN. MARK SCHMIDT & BRIG. GEN.
JOHN FURLOW, INVESTIGATION INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AS
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION FACILITY 14 (2005).
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equivalent information." Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell
explained: "[T]he President of the United States may no more
authorize the use of coercion and cruelty against detainees than he
may authorize torture." 114 In its Model Manual on the Law of
Armed Conflict, the ICRC explicates: "Although a prisoner of war
is not bound to give information (except his identity), he may be
willing to provide other information and there is no reason why the
capturin power should not ask questions ... [N]o coercion may be
used.""
Hypothetically, interrogators might "talk" to detainees and
prisoners might willingly volunteer information, but it is patently
illegal to strip naked, threaten, place in stress positions, suffocate, or
punish detainees so that interrogators might attain information. Dis-
tinctions between "torture" and "cruel and inhumane punishment"
are red herrings because both standards are prohibited.116 Professor
113 Geneva I, supra note 47, at 98; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on
Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1231, 1235 (2005) (affirming that "IHL
expressly prohibits not just torture, but any form of coercion of detainees during
interrogation.").
114 O'Connell, supra note 113, at 1237.
115 ICRC, FIGHT IT RIGHT: MODEL MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
FOR ARMED FORCES § 1405.2, available at http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/
linkedfiles/baha mousa/baha mousa inquiry-evidence/evidencel70510/bmi0814
8.pdf. ICRC, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 14-7, (2002), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law7_final.pdf ("it is unlawful to give
particularly cooperative prisoners of war more favorable treatment, such as better
accommodations, rations or pay, since all POWs are to be treated alike."); The
Committee on International Human Rights and the Committee on Military Affairs
and Justice, Human Rights Standards Applicable to the United States' Interroga-
tion of Detainees, 59 THE RECORD 183, 220 (2004).
116 Alan Clarke, Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1,
42-43 (2008); Jordan J. Paust, Prosecuting Military Commanders and Civilian
Ministers for Violations of the Laws of War: The Importance of Customary
International Law During Armed Conflict, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 601, 603
(2006) (hooding and stripping detainees naked for interrogation and using dogs to
strike fear are each forms of torture, a jus cogens violation, and a "patently illegal
tactic that was authorized and ordered in memos by Secretary Rumsfeld and others
as part of a common plan for use in Guantanamo and even in Iraq."); O'Connell,
supra note 113, at 1239 (noting that the allegation "that some individuals have no
right not to be tortured or abused while in detention is simply wrong.").
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Jordan Paust stated: "I know of no other instance in our history
when a Secretary of Defense, top U.S. Generals, or a DOD Working
Group approved such denials of protection or the use of interroga-
tion tactics that were either patently violative of the laws of war or
could clearly constitute violations in various circumstances."1 17 The
same psychological abuse approaches have been condemned for
several decades."" One might surmise that top officials in the Bush
Administration were cognizant of the history.
3. Specific Orders for Abu Ghraib
After dismissing other generals who apparently were not
comfortable imposing extreme interrogation methods on detainees at
Guantinamo Bay, such as stress positions, deprivation of food, and
intimidation with dogs, 119 Major General Geoffrey D. Miller did
implement orders at Guantinamo Bay and Rumsfeld instructed
Miller to use those same methods on Iraqi prisoners who should
have been afforded POW protection under the Geneva Conven-
tions. 120 Miller traveled to Iraq and directed Janis Karpinski,121 the
US Army Reserve officer who managed Abu Ghraib, to "Gitmoize"
Abu Ghraib by extending interrogation tactics used at Guantinamo
Bay. 122 Karpinski explained that Miller visited Abu Ghraib in early
117 Paust, supra note 87, at 863. A more mild interpretation is that "the Bush
Administration's failure to implement a clear Convention III policy in Iraq ignited
a chain of events that led to the abuse of numerous detainees." Alison
Croessmann, Note, Congress' Preliminary Response to the Abu Ghraib Prison
Abuses Room for Reform?, 71 BROOKLYN L. REv. 945, 978 (2005).
"' Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 106, at 405-07.
119 Paust, supra note 65, at 348; Robert Bejesky, Closing Gitmo Due to the
Epiphany Approach to Habeas Corpus During the Military Commissions Circus,
50 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 43, 62-65 (2013) (listing abuses and referencing
investigations by the FBI and human rights groups that condemned the abuses).
120 McCoY, supra note 28, at 133-34 (citing Taguba Report, supra note 73, at 7-8,
15); Murphy, supra note 82, at 828-29.
121 McCoY, supra note 28, at 134.
122 Frontline, Interview with Janis Karpinski, Gulf War Veteran and Army
Reservist, PBS (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/torture/interviews/karpinski.htnl. Scholars readily recognized this con-
nection between orders to "Gitmoize" Abu Ghraib and wrongdoing. See Manfred
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September 2003 and instructed: "[W]e're going to train the MPs to
work with the interrogators ... We're going to select the MPs who
can do this, and they're going to work specifically with the interro-
gation team."123 The Taguba investigation concluded that Miller
considered it essential for MPs to "be actively engaged in setting the
conditions for successful exploitation of the internees." 124
The orders were affirmed by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the
military commander in Iraq. In October 2003, Sanchez wrote in a
classified memo that interrogators at Abu Ghraib would work with
MPs to "manipulate an internee's emotions and weaknesses" and
augment the effectiveness of interrogations.125 Interrogators imple-
mented the orders because in February 2004, the ICRC reported that
military intelligence in Iraq was using "physical and psychological
coercion" in a "systematic way to gain confessions and extract
,,126information. Tactics included positioning detainees in "painful
stress positions" for prolonged durations, hooding prisoners to
disorient and restrict breathing, placing them in pitch-black cells for
several days at a time, and parading them around naked.127 Soldiers
seen in the photos later explained that military intelligence officers
Nowak, Moritz Birk & Tiphanie Crittin, The Obama Administration and
Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 40 (2011). See also Joseph Pugliese, Abu Ghraib and its
Shadow Archives, 19 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 247, 257 (2007); Sadat, supra
note 112, at 312.
123 McCoY, supra note 28, at 134; Wilde, supra note 73, at 758-59 (noting the
approach of MPs softening up detainees); Strauss, supra note 39, at 1275 ("they
were responding to orders from higher-ups to 'soften up' the detainees for
interrogation"). See also Charles H. Brower II, The Lives of Animals, the Lives of
Prisoners, and the Revelations of Abu Ghraib, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353,
1376 (2004).
Taguba Report, supra note 73, at 8-9; JAMEs R. SCHLESINGER ET AL., FINAL
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS
10 (2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/aug2004/d20040824
finalreport.pdf [hereinafter Schlesinger Report] (stating that "MG Miller called for
the military police and military intelligence soldiers to work cooperatively, with
the military police 'setting the conditions' for interrogations").
125 Smith, supra note 50, at A17.
126 HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 25.
127 Id.; Pearlstein, supra note 12, at 1269.
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instructed them to subject prisoners to these methods because it was
an effective means of attaining information.128 Investigations
exposed that the interrogation methods were approved by top offi-
cials, but that those committing wrongdoing somehow misunder-
stood their obligations. 129
The reported justification for implementing interrogation
operations in Iraq was that General Sanchez was confronted with a
swelling insurgency and commanders believed that interrogation
could reveal vital information,1 30 but in implementing the interro-
gation operations, commanders also recognized distinctions with
Afghanistan and Abu Ghraib by admitting that the Geneva Conven-
tion was fully applicable in Iraq. Not only is "cheating" by
coercing and forcing information from detainees specifically what
the Geneva Convention prohibitions were devised to prevent, but
causal inferences about the insurgency might be reversed. Perhaps if
combatants believe that they will be treated with respect, they may
surrender, but if they perceive that they will be tortured, they may be
128 Joel Roberts, Female GI in Abuse Photos Talks, CBS NEWS, May 12, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500257_162-616921.html.
129 Fay Report, supra note 43, at 10, 15-16, 25-26, 29 (acknowledging that
"[i]nterrogating detainees was a massive undertaking," that it was intended to
"gather initial battlefield intelligence," and that orders were issued for
interrogation but contending that soldiers somehow misunderstood the policies);
Josh White, Abuse Report Widens Scope of Culpability, WASH. POST, Aug. 26,
2004, at A01 ("The generals also describe confusing and contradictory
interrogation policies that led some military intelligence personnel to abuse
detainees because they thought they were following accepted practices.").
130 Schlesinger Report, supra note 124, at 10-11.
131 General Ricardo Sanchez Testimony Before Senate Committee on Armed
Services, May, 19, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A39851-2004May19.html (Sanchez testifying: "In September [2003], a team
headed by General Geoffrey Miller assessed our intelligence interrogation activi-
ties and human detention operations. We reviewed recommendations with the
expressed understanding, reinforced in conversations between General Miller and
me, that they might have to be modified for use in Iraq where the Geneva Conven-
tion was fully applicable."); Wallach, supra note 102, at 624.
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less likely to surrenderl32 and more prone to organize an
insurgency.1 33
Internal memos verified that Miller explained to Karpinski,
during his early-September 2003 visit to Iraq, that "teams, com-
prised of operational behavioral psychologists and psychiatrists, are
essential in developing integrated interrogation strategies and
,,134-assessing interrogation intelligence. Former military interroga-
tors disclosed that psychologists and psychiatrists used prisoner
medical files to advise interrogators on the effective means of
provoking "detainees' fears and longings to increase duress."1s In a
sworn statement, Pappas explained that the MP guards were
132 David A. Wallace, Torture v. the Basic Principles of the U.S. Military, ICJ 6 2
(309), May 2008.
133 See generally PHILIP BOBBIT, TERROR AND CONSENT 183 (2008) (believing
that reactions to state violence can inflame and that accurate indicia are required to
"determine when a state ... threatens to become a state of terror"); P.W. Singer,
Can't Win with "Em, Can't Go to War without Em": Private Military Contractors
and Counterinsurgency, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Sept. 2007, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2007/09/27militarycontractors (an Iraqi
government official stating that private contractors are "part of the reason for all
the hatred that is directed at Americans"). Chris Mackey, an Army interrogator in
Afghanistan, believed that "images of depravity will inflame anti-American
sentiment in the Muslim world for a generation, driving who knows how many
would-be jihadists into the ranks of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations."
McCoY, supra note 28, at 200 (citing CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE
INTERROGATORS: INSIDE THE SECRET WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA 472 (2004)); Scott
Horton, A Nuremberg Lesson: Torture Scandal Began Far Above "Rotten Apples,
L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 2005, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/20/
opinion/oe-horton20 (stating that "stories of [torture in detention centers] ... were
spread everywhere among the people, and later by the prisoners who were
freed."). Likewise, if other innocent detainees were similarly defiled with
interrogation practices, released, and communicated injustices to other Iraqis, the
fear of or desire to avenge torturous treatment might have sparked insurgencies.
134 DEP'T OF DEF., ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION
AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 5 (2003), available at http://www.
gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB140/a20.pdf. The Behavioral Science
Consultation Team was granted access to detainee records to assist in developing
tailored interrogation plans. MCCOY, supra note 28, at 127 (citing M. Gregg
Bloche & Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors and Interrogators at Guantdnamo Bay,
353(1) N.E. J. MED. (July 7, 2005)).
135 MCCOY, supra note 28, at 182; Graham, supra note 90, at 81.
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typically given "a copy of the interrogation plan and a written note
as to how to execute [it]," and [t]he doctor and psychiatrist also look
at the files to see what the interrogation plan recommends."136
Having medical and health professionals assist in stimulating or
moderating a degree of mental pain to attain "intelligence informa-
tion" is a controversial application of the doctors' Hippocratic
Oath and further demonstrates a systemization of interrogation
that was fully incorporated into the chain of command.
4. A Quagmire of Confusion
Even with acknowledgements that interrogators were auth-
orized to use extraordinary methods to acquire intelligence (which
was in violation of the Geneva Convention), the highest levels of the
U.S. government approved a list of interrogation techniques, and
that there were specific interrogation directives for Iraq and would
involve MPs, an alternative chronology superseded these facts; MPs
should not have been participating in interrogation operations or at
least should not have perpetrated the specific harms for which they
were accused. After Miller apprised Karpinski of the intention to
enlist MPs to make detainees more biddable, the chain of command
became obscure.13 8 Apparently, shortly after Miller's visit, cell
blocks 1-A and 1-B, the locations of misconduct depicted on 60
Minutes, were informally removed from Karpinski's command and
situated within the authority of Colonel Thomas M. Pappas and
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Jordan, two intelligence officers who
reported directly to General Sanchez in Baghdad. 139 On November
136 Thomas M. Pappas, Sworn Statement for ODCSOPS 3, (2004), available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/040709/Pappas.pdf.
137 Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 106, at 392-94; Adam
Benforado & Jon Hanson, Narve Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in
Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499, 552 (2008) (noting that participating
physicians, nurses and technicians apparently did not object).
138 Brenner, supra note 7, at 41.
139 McCoY, supra note 28, at 137 (citing Taguba Report, supra note 73, at 7-8,
15); Adam Zagorin, New Charges in Abu Ghraib?, TIME, Apr. 26, 2006, available
at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1187871,00.html (stating that
"Jordan ... helped direct day-to-day activities in the Abu Ghraib cell block where
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19, 2003, Sanchez officially removed all of Abu Ghraib prison from
Karpinski's command and assigned it to Pappas's 205h Military
Intelligence Brigade.140 On January 13, 2004, less than two months
after this operational control shifted within Abu Ghraib, the lewd
pictures circulated to U.S. government authorities. 141
After the photos were publicized, Karpinski was appalled by
the sexual humiliation and Sanchez maintained that Karpinski's
"poor leadership" over the MPs produced these "incidents over the
preceding six months." 142 It is difficult to imagine how Karpinski
could have easily managed the situation; the Pentagon chain of
command empowered Karpinski with overall authority for hundreds
of soldiers operating at sixteen prison facilities in Iraql43 when she
had been a member of the Army Reserve with no experience
managing a prison facility prior to being activated in June 2003.14 It
most the abuses occurred" and others who potentially have knowledge of orders
included Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Col Pappas, and Gen.
Geoffrey Miller).
140 McCoy, supra note 28, at 137 (citing Taguba Report, supra note 73, at 38);
Philip Shenon, The Struggle for Iraq: Detainees; Officer Suggests Iraqi Jail Abuse
was Encouraged, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.con
2004/05/02/world/the-struggle-for-iraq-detainees-officer-suggests-iraqi-j ail-abuse-
was-encouraged.html?ref=janiskarpinski (Karpinski stating that "the prison
cellblock where the abuse occurred was under the tight control of Army military
intelligence officers who may have encouraged the abuse.").
141 McCoY, supra note 28, at 142.
142 Id. (Karpinski expressing: "I was shocked. I felt sick to my stomach.... And
not that they were torturing these people, but this was absolute humiliation of a
sexual nature, and [the MPs'] faces seemed to reveal that they were enjoying it....
Do you know what this does in an Arab culture? Do you know what you are
doing? This is the equivalent of castrating them in public."). Brigadier General
Mark Kimmitt spoke for Sanchez and blamed "leadership, supervision" of
Brigadier General Janis Karpinski because she was the military police commander
for Iraq. Id. at 144.
143 Scott Higham, Josh White & Christian Davenport, A Prison on the Brink,
WASH. POST, May 9, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A1 1413-2004May8_4.html.
1 Atif Rehman, Note, The Court of Last Resort: Seeking Redress for Victims of
Abu-Ghraib Torture Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 493, 496 (2006).
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is the Pentagon's poor judgment to impose such encompassing
responsibility on one individual.
The Taguba report concurred that commanders did not
adequately supervise MPs or take corrective action, but also blamed
failures on "lack of knowledge, implementation, and emphasis of
basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements." 145
Karpinski retorted that Sanchez and Miller instilled the milieu by
instructing that detainees should be harshly treated.146 Ostensibly
agreeing with Karpinski, Lt. Randall Schmidt noted: "[Major Gen.
Miller] was responsible for the conduct of interrogations that I found
to be abusive and degrading ... He was responsible." 147 The Taguba
report also criticizes higher-level officers-Pappas, Phillabaum,
Jordan, DiNenna, and Reese-and low-level officers-Raeder,
Emerson, Lipinski, and Snider. 148
Army investigators documented an inappropriate separation
of authority between commanders and prison management over
intelligence directives, which created an "ambiguous command
relationship" that was not "doctrinally sound."149 Moreover,
145 Taguba Report, supra note 73, at 11, 13, 19-20, 37-44; ZIMBARDO, supra note
8, at 388-89.
146 ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 337; Pugliese, supra note 122, at 258 (noting that
Karpinski explained that Miller told her, "[L]ook, the first thing you have to do is
treat these prisoners like dogs. If they ever get the idea that they're anything more
than dogs, you've lost control of your interrogation."). See also GOUREVITCH &
MORRIS, supra note 81, at 48; JANIs KARPINSKI WITH STEVEN STRASSER, ONE
WOMAN's ARMY 197 (2006). Some military personnel allegedly referred to Arab
prisoners and other racially derogatory terms. Pugliese, supra note 122, at 269.
147 Hersh, supra note 109.
148 ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 389; Taguba Report, supra note 73, at 45-46, 91,
64-67, 120 explaining that Pappas did not inhibit subordinates from departing
from sanctioned U.S. interrogation methods and the Geneva Conventions and did
not prevent misconduct after ICRC warnings, and Lieutenant Colonel Jordan
inadequately supervised soldiers under his command and did not verse soldiers in
the Geneva Convention rules).
149 Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command: How the Department of Defense
Mishandled the Disaster at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004,
available at http://www.newyorker.conarchive/2004/05/17/040517fa-fact2?
currentPage=all; Taguba Report, supra note 73, at 29, 38 (noting the "unclear
lanes of responsibility, and ambiguous relationship between the MI and MP
assets" and an "ambiguous command relationship").
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changing interrogation directives confused personnel, so troops and
interrogators were ill-trained, and procedures to report abuses
were lacking.152 Explanations of neglect are not altogether
reconcilable with the Taguba report conclusion which stated that
anonymous intelligence operatives were obligating and training MPs
to "break down prisoners" before interrogation.153
The predicament with asserting that soldiers, interrogators,
and mid-level officials somehow all misunderstood obligations
under the Geneva Conventions is that the military follows orders
and the Bush Administration issued both general and specific orders
to conduct abusive interrogations in Iraq when any form of
interrogation is wholesale prohibited under the Geneva Conven-
tion. 154 When Miller, Sanchez, Pappas, Karpinski, and others
evidently permitted abuse at Abu Ghraib,155 they were ostensibly
following orders from Rumsfeld and other White House officials.
Trying to pinpoint culpable acts between directives from top
directives and perpetration resulted in a resplendent wheel of
accusation-casting.
Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice states that
a "general order or regulation is lawful unless it is contrary to the
Constitution ... or for some other reason is beyond the authority of
150 Fay Report, supra note 43, at 8 ("[B]y October 2003, interrogation policy in
Iraq had changed three times in less than thirty days and it became very confusing
as to what techniques could be employed and at what level non-doctrinal
approaches had to be approved.").
151 Jones Report, supra note 76, at 19-22 (stating that Military Intelligence and
Military Police did not receive adequate training on interrogation techniques and
did not understand the Geneva Conventions); Pearlstein, supra note 12, at 1271-72
(2005).
152 Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account
of International Law Compliance, 104 A.J.I.L. 1, 16 (2010) (drawing comparisons
to the My Lai massacre).
153 Taguba Report, supra note 73, at 19 (describing how interrogators
complimented MPs for breaking down the prisoners); Fay Report, supra note 43,
at 69 (stating that "MI interrogators started directing nakedness at Abu Ghraib as
early as 16 September 2003 to humiliate and break down detainees.").
154 See supra Part II(D)(3).
155 ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 337.
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the official issuing it."156 The Manual for Courts Martial states that
"[i]t is a defense to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant
to orders unless the accused knew the orders to be unlawful or a
person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the
orders to be unlawful."157 A soldier who chooses to disobey a
potentially illegal order can face insubordination, courts-martial, and
negligent or willful dereliction of duty charges, which can impose
incarceration. 1ss After Spc. Charles Graner was sentenced to ten
years for participating in the Abu Ghraib atrocities, his mother
highlighted the legal and moral dilemma: "He got 10 years in prison
for something he was told to do ... [H]e committed a crime for
obeying orders, and he would have committed a crime if he didn't
obey orders."1 59
Part III explains why the level of culpability should be
reversed-those at the top of the command chain should be most
culpable because they issued illegal orders, those in the middle
should be less culpable than superiors because they possess a
heighted opportunity to evaluate directives more fully than subor-
dinates, and the MPs should be viewed as least culpable. Rules,
expectations, and military culture are elements that inherently
undermine the free choice of soldiers, making it more unreasonable
to impose the foremost level of culpability on low-level troops for
adhering to chain of command directives.
156 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL: UNITED STATES pt. IV, 16(C)(1)(C) (2012)
[hereinafter MCM], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/
MCM-2012.pdf.
157 Id. at 916(d).
15 Unif. Code of Military Justice §§ 893 art. 93; 897 art. 97; 916 art. 116; 918 art.
118; 919 art. 120; 924 (2008); MCM, supra note 156, at A2-26, A2-29, A2-31,
A2-32.
159 Susan Candiotti & Jim Polk, Graner sentenced to 10 years for abuses, CNN,
(Jan. 15, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/01/15/graner.court.martial/.
While the wrongs were much more egregious than those committed at Abu
Ghraib, studies found that soldiers complied with directives during the Vietnam
War not because they thought that attacks massacring women and children were
morally right, but because they were "just following orders" of superiors. Tom R.
Tyler, TRUST AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, 277 (Braithwaite, Valerie, & Levi,
eds. 1998).
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III. BASIS FOR CRIMINAL CULPABILITY
A. Chain of Command
The legal doctrine of command responsibility affirms that
senior officials may not only be held responsible for the acts of
subordinates, but could be deemed more accountable than subor-
dinates for violating domestic or international law.16 In 1949, the
High Command Case confirmed that officers cannot docilely ignore
subordinates who implement illicit directives of superiors and
remain immune from criminal responsibility, but also that culpa-
bility does not perfunctorily apply equally across the chain of
command.161 Addressing obligations of superior officials, the
tribunal stated that "[t]here must be a personal dereliction that ... is
directly traceable to him or where his failure to supervise his
subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his part." 162
The U.S. Supreme Court also affirmed the doctrine of
command responsibility when it held that superior officers can be
liable if they (1) held effective control over subordinates who viola-
ted the law of nations, (2) knew or should have been aware of the
subordinates' illegal conduct, and (3) with knowledge, the superior
official did not undertake reasonable steps to thwart the subordi-
nates' illegal conduct.163 If the test is met, a soldier or officer who
160 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3rd 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that
command responsibility is incorporated into international and domestic law); Ruth
W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 29, 29 (2005) ("Accountability ... implies that
some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge
whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to
impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met.").
161 U.S. v. von Leeb: The High Command Case in XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 512 (United States Government
Printing Office, 1953).
162 Id. at 543.
163 Pearlstein, supra note 12, at 1268 (referencing doctrine from In re Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1 (1946); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FM 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
501; JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, 202-04
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exercises command authority can be held accountable for what is
carried out within the chain of command.164 Consequently, interna-
tional law and U.S. court precedent both confirm that commanding
military officers cannot remain willfully ignorant of the war crimes
of subordinates, but are obliged to investigate wrongdoing and must
react and emend the conduct, or liability can attach to the
commanding officerl65 based on a negligence standard. 166
(Chr. Brian J. Bill ed., 2000); The Committee on International Human Rights,
Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to "Extraordinary
Renditions, " 60 THE RECORD 13, 126 (2005) (referencing that international
criminal tribunals follow an analogous test).
16 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, AR 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY, § 2-1(b) (June
2006).
165 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 49, arts. 86-87. This is also consistent with the
ICC Statute, which states that a "military commander or person failed to take all
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress
their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
art. 28(a)(ii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://untreaty.un.org/
cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm; Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment, P 383 (Nov. 16, 1998), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/
tjug/en/981116judg-en.pdf (holding that a leader is culpable when
"(1) he had actual knowledge, established through direct or
circumstantial evidence, that his subordinates were committing
or about to commit crimes [prohibited by binding international
law] ... or (2) where he had in his possession information of a
nature, which at the least, would put him on notice of the risk of
such offenses by indicating the need for additional investigation
in order to ascertain whether such crimes were committed or
were about to be committed by his subordinates.");
4 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
34-35 (William S. Hein & Co. 1997) (1948); 8 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 70-71 (William S. Hein & Co.
1997) (1949); 12 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS 70-77, 92-95 (William S. Hein & Co. 1997) (1948); Amy J.
Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and
International Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 251, 266 (2009) (ICTY citing a report by
the Commission of Experts, which stated that superiors are "individually respon-
sible for a war crime or crime against humanity committed by a subordinate.").
166 Rome Statute, supra note 165, art. 28 (requiring leaders and commanders to
react when the commander should have known that subordinates were committing
proscribed misconduct and did not reasonably endeavor to impede the crimes).
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Even though the U.S. has resolutely accepted the doctrine of
command responsibility, the U.S. government and courts have only
imposed command responsibility on foreign military hierarchies,
and have never subjected U.S. military commanders to criminal
charges on a conspicuous command responsibility approach.167 In
the interrogation misconduct cases, the Bush Administration did
adduce the import of abiding by international and domestic law and
intrinsically endorsed command responsibility by stating that those
responsible would be brought to justice, but the omission was that
they were not participants in the criminal cases. The substantive
offense for torturous interrogation tactics is binding and prohibited
under US lawl68 and complicity is punishable, but several systemic
and informal influences and institutional mechanisms evince how
subordinates can be impelled to execute nefarious and potentially
illegal directives and why there is an apparent expanse between
civilian expectations for command responsibility and how law
relating to command responsibility is actually enforced.
B. Systemic Influences
Rules and culture within organizations encourage confor-
mity, foster obedience to authority,169 marginalize dissent, and
Not that there was much to praise in the statute, but in 2006, the Military
Commissions Act incorporated a negligence standard for superiors by making
them responsible when they knew "or should have known" that a subordinate
would commit a crime and failed to prevent it; Military Commissions Act of 2006,
10 § U.S.C. § 950q(3) (2011).
167 Melissa Epstein Mills, Brass-Collar Crime: A Corporate Model for Command
Responsibility, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 25, 25 (2010).
168 Unif. Code of Military Justice §§ 893 art. 93, 897 art. 97; 916 art. 116; 918 art.
118; 919 art. 119; 920 art. 120; 924 at pt. IV, P 16.c.(3)(a), at IV-24 (2008)
(stating that a commander's authority and obligations can derive from a "treaty,
statute, regulation, lawful order, standard operating procedure, or custom of the
service"). Torture and war crimes are punishable under the War Crimes Act of
1996, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the Anti-Torture Act of 1996.
ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 406.
169 Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM AND MARY L. REV.
135, 208-09 (2005).
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bolster consonance among employees and superiors within organi-
zations due to the prospect of punishment, demotions, incentives for
promotion, merger of world views, and the compulsion to cultivate
favorable impressions and achieve acceptance.170 With his research,
Stanford Psychology Professor Philip Zimbardo has demonstrated
that system power within an institutional structure can endow higher
authority with prerogatives to act in ways that "would ordinarily be
constrained by pre-existing laws, norms, morals, and ethics."17 In
comparison to civilian bureaucracies, military bureaucracies ensure
an elevated conformity and discipline throughout the chain of
command because of the stringent hierarchical culture of loyalty and
obedience, apprehension of internal punishment,172 and the mili-
tary's need to encourage fulfillment of the military mission and
maintain order.17 3
The puissant forces that compel conformity to the chain of
command within a national bureaucracy that normally holds realist
visions of the world,174 interacted with hawkish neoconservative
government discourse that invoked imperatives and dread to
170 Bejesky, Politico, supra note 22, at 74-75; Tom R. Tyler, Patrick E. Callahan &
Jeffrey Frost, Armed, and Dangerous (?): Motivating Rule Adherence Among
Agents of Social Control, 41 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 457, 458 (2007) (noting that
studies on law enforcement confirm that abuse of power can manifest in a wide
variety of contexts).
171 ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 226-27
172 Dickinson, supra note 169, at 208-09. Commanders can subject soldiers to non-
judicial penalties. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2006); JOHN M. LINDLEY, "A SOLDIER Is ALSO
A CITIZEN": THE CONTROVERSY OVER MILITARY JUSTICE, 1917-1920, at 165-66
(1990); Martha Minow, Living Up to Rules: Holding Soldiers Responsible for
Abusive Conduct and the Dilemma of the Superior Orders Defense, 52 MCGILL
L.J. 1, 15 (2007) (explaining that "[1]oyalty, hopes for promotion, fears of
retaliation, and solidarity with those in authority" are puissant compulsions "even
though the doctrine of command responsibility obviates the difficulties in
establishing orders of actual knowledge in advance of the violations.").
173 Tyler et al., supra note 170, at 459.
174 See generally, SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE
THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (1957) (generally
perceiving the military as realists and civilians as liberalists).
175 Bejesky, Politico, supra note 22, at 39-44, 71-78.
2013-14 141
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vol. XXXII
176-generate trans-societal conformity, abridging the perceived
blameworthiness of the officials. For example, Professor Benjamin
Davis construed that high-level civilians and generals "may have
caused the criminality" at U.S. military prisons but masked their
actions at most as misfeasance, rather than malfeasance. Indica-
ting that bureaucratic culture can encourage compliance with
directives that exceed misfeasance of superiors, Professor Richard
Seamon explained: "Official torture ... is made possible by laws
empowering government lawfully to detain people, [and] employing
officials (guards, etc.) whose conduct toward detainees would be
unlawful if it occurred outside that setting." Professor Leila Sadat
elevated the level of blameworthiness by emphasizing that the Bush
Administration issued the documents and "the propaganda suppor-
ting them have led to the systematic use of torture," while "U.S.
investigators, U.S. courts, and U.S. lawyers ... carried out the gov-
ernment's plan."179 An even stronger critique is offered by Professor
Joseph Pugliese, who remarked: "... I view the regime of torture
that was deployed at Abu Ghraib by the U.S. military as enabled by
176 ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 226-27 (noting that "[t]hose in authority present
the [policy or] program as good and virtuous, as a highly valuable moral imper-
ative;" which, in the case of the Bush Administration, consisted of "frighten[ing]
citizens into willingly sacrificing their basic civil rights," "justifying a pre-emptive
war of aggression against Iraq," and constituting governance over the system of
military prison management); Clarke, supra note 116, at 20 (stating that "[t]he
teachings of modem psychology, sociology, and history suggest that when faced
with systemic, widespread torture and cruel treatment, one should not look at a
'few bad apples' but rather at failures of command and control.").
177 Benjamin G. Davis, Refluat Stercus: A Citizen's View of Criminal Prosecution
in U.S. Domestic Courts of High-Level U.S. Civilian Authority and Military
Generals for Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL. COMMENT. 503, 559-60 (2008).
178 Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 756
(2006); Luban, supra note 68, at 1427 (instilling such norms in institutions and
society a "torture culture.").
179 Leila Nadya Sadat, The Unlawful Enemy Combatant and the U.S. War on
Terror, 37 DENV. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 539, 541 (2009).
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a violent neofascist politics indissociably tied to a codified imperial-
fascist aesthetics." 80
C. Reduced Rights of Military Personnel and
Obedience to Authority
The highest echelon of the military can even be restrained
when confronted by adverse White House policies. Chris Matthews,
MSNBC talk show host, queried: "How come every time a general
retires he starts trashing the president's war policy, but doesn't say a
word until he retires?"181 Assuming that commanders abide by the
most lucid military rules governing whistle-blowing and dissent,
remaining taciturn while in the service may be rational. Article 88 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice enumerates that members of
the military cannot express "contempt toward officials," 182 which
has been construed as prohibiting both on- and off-duty speech that
criticizes the president and other political officials.183 Other provi-
sions are somewhat akin to crime by analogy or are substantially
open to interpretation. Article 134 is a general rule that authorizes
prosecuting military personnel for unreasonable conduct and expres-
sions or behavior that places the military service in disrepute. 184
Similarly, Article 133 affirms that members of the military cannot
1s0 Pugliese, supra note 122, at 248, 252 (assessing responsibility on the guards is
brought to fore by the cinematographic allure of "bring [ing] into focus the
voyeuristic intrusion of the camera within the relations of torturer and tortured.").
Thus, it is the charm of the fetish and the "ocular apex originally occupied by the
photographer." Id. at 252.
181 Hardball with Chris Matthews, MSNBC, (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15045586.
182 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006).
183 Richard W. Aldrich, Comment, Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice: A Military Muzzle or Just a Restraint on Military Muscle?, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 1189, 1199-1208 (1986) (Article 88 is apt to be unconstitutional if the
language were applied to civilians); John G. Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the
President: An Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1697 (1968).
184 10 U.S.C.A. § 934 (2012).
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engage in "[c]onduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman,"185
which is applicable to officers and might refer to almost any
criminal offense.1 86
The military hierarchy can also restrict constitutional rights
of its members, 87 including the right to free speech and to assemble
against government policy, and those restrictions are heightened
during a time of war.189 For example, nine months before the Iraq
" 10 U.S.C.A. § 933 (2012).
186 Elizabeth L. Hillman, Gentlemen Under Fire: The U.S. Military and "Conduct
Unbecoming, " 26 LAW AND INEQ. 1, 2-3, 5 (2008).
187 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974); United States v. Priest, 45
C.M.R. 338, 343-44 (1972); Barney F. Bilello, Note, Judicial Review and
Soldiers' Rights: Is the Principle of Deference a Standard of Review, 17 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 465, 467-68 (1989); Linda Sugin, Note, First Amendment Rights of
Military Personnel: Denying Rights to Those Who Defend Them, 62 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 855 (1987). While a Circuit Court of Appeals judge, Justice Kennedy wrote:
"One does not surrender his or her constitutional rights upon entering the military,
but the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that constitutional rights must be
viewed in light of special circumstances and needs of the armed forces." Beller v.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980).
188 Parker v. Levy, 417 at 759 (quoting Priest, 21 C.M.A. at 570) (Justice
Rehnquist reasoning that "[t]he armed forces depend on a command structure that
... ultimately involve the security of the Nation itself. Speech that is protected in
the civil population may ... undermine the effectiveness of response to
command."). While the rights to express dissent and to assemble are protected
under the First Amendment, military troops are prohibited from attending a rally
to protest military actions or from advocating an opinion against incumbent
administrations. U.S. Dep't of Defense, Directive 1344.10, Political Activities by
the Armed Forces on Active Duty, para. E3.2, E3.3 (2004).
189 U.S. Dep't of Defense, supra note 188, para. E3.2, E3.3; Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. at 738 (upholding the criminal conviction of Howard Levy, an Army doctor,
who made statements in opposition to the Vietnam War and violated Article 134,
which prohibits making statements "with design to promote disloyalty and
disaffection among the troops."); United States v. Daniels 42 C.M.R. 131, 137
(C.M.A. 1970) (In opposing the Vietnam War and urging others not to go to
Vietnam, the court convicted Daniels because his statements caused "an impair-
ment of the loyalty and obedience"); United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338, 345
(1972) (serviceman Roger Priest distributed 800 copies of a newsletter that urged
readers to not go to the Vietnam War and was convicted, with the military court
holding that "the Government is entitled to protect itself in advance against a
calculated call for revolution."); United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 444
(C.A.A.F. 2008) (servicemember convicted because "conduct was to the prejudice
144
The Abu Ghraib Convictions
War, the news reported intra-Pentagon discord over whether Iraq
was really a threat or possessed WMDs, but after the president
ordered the invasion, the military chain of command conformed and
the American media exhibited near-amnesia over the terms of the
congressional authorization for the use of force and the original
reason for war.190 As a result of the false pretenses that led to war,191
Lieutenant Ehren Watada called the Iraq War "manifestly illegal"
and rejected deployment orders because he believed he would be
committing war crimes, 192 and the military attempted to prosecute
Watada.193 Quite affected is that criticism about the Pentagon or the
government's military or war policy is frequently risky because of
the retort slogan to "support the troops," 194 but if troops are
mandated to refrain from expressing dissenting opinions and are
of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring
discredit to the armed forces" when he made antigovernment and racist comments
online); United States v. Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165, 168 (1967) (holding that the
military could restrict Lieutenant Howe's right to free speech under UMC Article
88 when Howe attended a protest and held a sign that read "Let's Have More Than
a Choice Between Petty Ignorant Facists in 1968" and "End Johnson's Facist
Aggression in Vietnam.").
190 Bejesky, Politico, supra note 22, at 72-74; Bejesky, Public Diplomacy, supra
note 17, at 971-74.
191 Walter Pincus, Records Could Shed Light on Iraq Group, WASH. POST, June 9,
2008, at A15 (quoting SSCI Chairman John D. Rockefeller: "In making the case
for war, the [Bush] administration repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when it
was unsubstantiated, contradicted or even nonexistent ... Sadly, the Bush
Administration led the nation to war under false pretenses."); Bejesky, Intelligence
Information, supra note 20, at 811-12.
192 Sarah N. Rosen, Comment, Be All That You Can Be? An Analysis of and
Proposed Alternative to Military Speech Regulations, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 875,
886 (2010).
193 Id. at 886-87. More recently, Marine Sargeant Gary Stein was facing
dishonorable discharge for criticizing President Obama. Marine Sgt. Gary Stein
should go for criticizing Obama on Facebook, Board says, CBS NEWs, Apr. 6,
2012, available at http://www.cbsnews.con8301-201_162-57410342/marine-sgt-
gary-stein-should-go-for-criticizing-obama-on-facebook-board-says/.
194 Robert Bejesky, Political Penumbras of Taxes and War Powers for the 2012
Election, 14 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 49-52 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Political
Penumbras] (citing how politicians used the "support the troops" slogan during
both the Vietnam War and Iraq War).
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dictated what to believe and how to think, it seems unconscionable
to permit a high-level political agenda, based upon unsubstantiated
premises, to exploit enlistees making sacrifices. 195
Military justice further ensures obedience at the lower levels
of the chain of command,196 and cases involving disciplinary
structure and control are normally unchallengeable by military and
federal courts.197 Low-level soldiers are much more apt to be subject
to court-martial and punishmentl98 than higher-level military
officials, who may, at most, be subject to demotion, reprimand, and
other non-judicial penalties. 199 As Major General Enoch H. Crowder
emphasized, that "the real purpose of the court-martial is to enable
commanders to insure discipline in their forces." 200 If policymaker
and high-level impunity is widely perceived throughout the chain of
command, officers may not believe that they will be subject to
195 The mission became indeterminate. The Bush Administration ordered an inva-
sion due to Iraq's supposedly existing WMDs. Military personnel were involved
in an invasion based upon the premise that they were protecting American
security, and were later required to fulfill directives for an occupation with large-
scale detention operations that were unrelated to the originally-intended mission.
Yet troops must still follow orders, which may not be consistent with the per-
ceived mission for which they enlisted. See generally Bejesky, Political Penum-
bras, supra note 194, at 48-52 (members of Congress expressing resentment that
the Bush Administration exploited the "support the troops" slogan and noting that
they would not have approved of the Iraq War and placed troops in harm's way
had they known the truth about the false allegations about security threats).
196 Victor Hansen, Changes in Modern Military Codes and the Role of the Military
Commander: What Should the United States Learn from This Revolution?, 16
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 419, 423 (2008).
197 United States v. Wilson, 33 M.J. 797, 799 (A.C.M.R. 1991); Dynes v. Hoover,
61 U.S. 65 (1857) (Court refraining from reviewing a challenge to a court-martial
decision); Jonathan Lurie, The Role of the Federal Judiciary in the Governance of
the American Military: The United States Supreme Court and "Civil Rights and
Supervision" over the Armed Forces, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989 405 (Richard H. Kohn ed.,
1991).
19' Davis, supra note 177, at 550, 564.
199 Id. at 549.
200 Emily Reuter, Second Class Citizen Soldiers: A Proposal for Great First
Amendment Protection for America's Military Personnel, 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 315, 318-19 (2007).
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punishment for violations of the laws of war when they are follow-
ing orders of superiors, while lower-level soldiers may fear being
disciplined for reporting controversial matters up the chain of
command 201 or for rejecting to execute questionable or illegal
directives.
With this history, it is understandable that military personnel
may be reluctant to even dissent to the orders of superiors or act as
whistle-blowers. In the Abu Ghraib abuse, anecdotal evidence
adumbrates that Pentagon officials would have favored that soldier-
witnesses report the abuses, but evidence also suggests that soldiers
believed that they would have been ignored or disciplined for
reporting the abuse. For example, Sergeant Samuel Provance
furnished evidence of torture at Abu Ghraib, and he was stripped of
his military intelligence clearance, demoted, and transferred, but
purportedly not because he reported abuses, but because he did not
report the abuses sooner.202 Provance held a different impression
and reported that he did inform superiors, but "was told that the
honor of my unit and the Army depended on either withholding the
truth or outright lies."203 Provance further believed that everything
he "observed at Abu Ghrabi and in Iraq convinced" him that he
would be ignored, that the abuse "would be covered up," and that he
"would be considered a troublemaker and ostracized." 204 Similarly,
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officers admitted witnessing
201 Dickinson, supra note 152, at 369.
202 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 211 (further noting that in
June 2003, Sergeant Richard Ford complained about torture by members of his
unit in Samarra, Iraq, but he was threatened by the soldiers, called delusional, and
eventually "strapped to a gurney and medevaced to Germany as a psychiatric
patient."); ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 331 (stating that troops are reluctant to
report wrongdoing). Being a whistleblower could be dangerous. For example,
Sergeant Joseph Darby came forward with photos documenting the Abu Ghraib
atrocities after Corporal Charles Graner gave Darby the CD, but he became the
target of death threats. Sam Richie, Honoring Courage Seven Years After Abu
Ghraib, ACLU, Apr. 28, 2011, available at http://www.aclu.org/blog/content/
honoring-courage-seven-years-after-abu-ghraib.
203 Keith Rohman, Diagnosing and Analyzing Flawed Investigations: Abu Ghraib
as a Case Study, 28 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 1, 22 (2009).
204 Id
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prisoner atrocities and explained that they were threatened and
ordered to remain silent.205
Restraints, due to military chain of command rules, culture,
and secrecy ostensibly permit policymakers and high-level officers
to issue orders that troops would be expected to execute even when
directives are suspect. In addition to the military chain of command
orders, the relationship between the MPs and interrogators would
seem to further reduce the interpretation that MP obligations were
discretionary, but would instead persuade MPs to execute
directives .206
D. Interrogator Directives
Associated with the chain of command that involved top
officials issuing directives for interrogation, subordinate officers
implementing orders, and MPs being instructed to be involved in the
interrogation process, three categories of official interrogators
directed MPs-CIA agents, military intelligence interrogators, and
205 Neil A. Lewis, Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Reported after Abu Ghraib Disclosures,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/08/
politics/08abuse.html?_r-0. DIA officers stated that they observed prisoners being
severely being beaten by members of a secret special operations group called Task
Force 6-26, but when the DIA officers protested, they were intimidated by the
group and their pictures of the atrocities were confiscated. IN THE NAME OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 110. It was later revealed that Task Force 6-26 was
managing an off-the-books prison with "disappeared" detainees, some of whom
were killed and others extensively beaten, and the prison continued to operate
even after admonitions were purportedly issued. Id. at 196.
206 For example, in April 2005, the US Army Criminal Investigation Division was
ignored after it sent a memo to the CIA explaining that it was "unable to
thoroughly investigate" prisoner abuses because identities of suspects in the
Special Access Program and witnesses were protected under national security
laws. Hersh, supra note 109 (noting that "fake names were used."); ZIMBARDO,
supra note 8, at 219 ("[W]hen people feel anonymous in a situation, as if no one is
aware of their true identity (and thus that no one probably cares), they can more
easily be induced to behave in antisocial ways. This is especially so if the setting
grants permission."); Clarke, supra note 116, at 15; Luban, supra note 68, at 1427
(describing the scenarios of simulated abuse in the Stanford psychology
experiment).
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private contractors.207 What is most salient is that there were
intermediaries who were officially tasked by superior government
officials to execute harsh interrogations, which is a violation of the
Geneva Convention, and one or more actors directed MPs to be
involved with the interrogation process. Major General Taguba's
investigation ascertained that "interrogators actively requested that
MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable ...
military intelligence interrogations" and to have detainees ade-
quately "broken down" before interrogations.208
CIA interrogators also conducted interrogations at Abu
Ghraib. 209 The New York Times reported that the MPs learned inter-
rogation routines by "watching Central Intelligence Agency opera-
tives interrogating prisoners." 210 One aspect of the interrogation
directives involved Rumsfeld authorizing a Top Secret Special
Project Team, code named "Copper Green," which included CIA
agents. 211 Karpinski, soldiers, and investigations explained that in
late-2003 and around the time that Miller informed Karpinski that
MPs would participate with interrogators, mysterious operative-
207 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush
Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 389, 411 (2006); Jennifer Van Bergen
& Douglas Valentine, The Dangerous World of Indefinite Detentions: Vietnam to
Abu Ghraib, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 449, 453 (2006); Jeremy Waldron,
Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 1681, 1682 (2005) (noting that intelligence officials also directed conditions
for abuse).
208 Taguba Report, supra note 73, at 18-20 (stating that MPs believed that the
orders from military intelligence interrogators "insinuate[d] to the guards to abuse
the inmates."); Fay Report, supra note 43, at 69. According to SPC Ambuhl, had it
not been for military intelligence interrogators, the Abu Ghraib scandal would not
have occurred because "the detainees would have been in their cells, and we
would have been in the office watching a movie or drinking coffee." GOUREVITCH
& MORRIS, supra note 81, at 157; McCoy, supra note 28, at 176-77 (noting that a
document dated in January 2004 indicated that there was an Army investigation of
the 311th Military Intelligence Battalion at Mosul, Iraq, that stated Military
Intelligence "personnel and/or translators engaged in physical torture of
detainees.").
209 Douglas Jehl, C.LA. Cites Order on Supervised Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2004, at A7.
210 McCoy, supra note 28, at 136.
211 Id. at 132-33.
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interrogators with aliases began visiting Abu Ghraib in civilian
dress, and Karpinski explained that these were the individuals who
began taking pictures of nude detainees. 212
The Taguba report also stated that private military contrac-
tors (PMCs) were directing the MPs on how to execute interroga-
tions.213 Plaintiffs-detainees alleged in federal court that PMCs beat
prisoners, played loud music to deprive them of sleep, kept them
naked and exposed to cold temperatures, used electric shocks,
forced them to perform sex acts, threatened them with attack dogs,
and broke legs and poked out eyes.214 The Fay Report estimated that
one-third of the human rights violations at Abu Ghraib prison
215involved contractors. Contractors and the Army sprung into
accusation-casting mode over principal responsibility.216 A court
212 Id.; ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 349-50.
213 Taguba Report, supra note 73, at 18-20.
214 Jenny S. Lam, Comment, Accountability for Private Military Contractors
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1459, 1477 (2009).
215 Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised
Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 549, 555 (2005); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE., ACCOMPANYING SLIDES
TO SPECIAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING ON RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION OF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON FACILITY 7 (2005),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040826slides.pdf
(estimating that was that four private contractors and twenty-three military
intelligence officers were responsible for torture); Leland H. Kynes, Note, Letting
the CAT Out of the Bag: Providing a Civil Right of Action for Torture Committed
by U.S. Officials Abroad, an Obligation of the Convention Against Torture?, 34
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 187, 188 (2005); P.W. Singer, The Contract the Military
Needs to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2004, at B3. (stating that at Abu Ghraib,
sixteen out of forty-four cases of abuse were perpetrated by private contractors
outside the purview of a U.S. government actor).
216 Ariana Eunjung Cha & Renae Merle, Line Increasingly Blurred Between
Soldiers and Civilian Contractors, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at Al; Joel
Brinkley, U.S. Civilian Working at Abu Ghraib Disputes Army's Version of His
Role in Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2004, at A5; Joshua Chaffin, Contract
Interrogators Hired to Avoid Supervision, FIN. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at 9. Private
contractor interrogators also worked for the military, but the military was either
unaware that they were civilians or that the civilians would not take orders from
the military. Heather Carney, Prosecuting the Lawless: Human Rights Abuses and
Private Military Firms, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 329 (2006).
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case quoted Karpinski stating that private contractors "ordered these
,,217
things [abuses] to be done. Independent contractors apparently
also worked for the CIA.218
According to a recently published book, only six people had
comprehensive knowledge of the misconduct at Abu Ghraib, and
authors Christopher Graveline and Michael Clemens were purpor-
tedly two of the six. 219 Graveline and Clemens contend that the truth
is perched somewhere between the two extremes of a "few bad
apples" MPs and of orders being issued by top government
220 221leaders.20 The "few bad apples" explanation is wholly erroneous
because interactions among Miller, Sanchez, and Karpinski evince
that command directives were issued by the White House and
Secretary of Defense when no interrogation was legally permit-
ted,222 official interrogators were tasked with executing the top-level
orders, and interrogators directed MPs to participate with some level
of specificity.
The contention herein is not that the MP's vividly docu-
mented debauchery should not be punished, but to emphasize that
military orders within the chain of command mandate adherence. A
superior officer can be held criminally liable for not correcting
actions of subordinates under dereliction of duty,223 but subordinate
officers are in dereliction of duty for not obeying "a violation of a
lawful general order or as an act which constitutes dereliction of
217 CACI Premier Tech., Inc. v. Rhodes, 536 F.3d 280, 288 (4th Cir. 2008).
218 Renae Merle & Ellen McCarthy, 6 Employees from CACI International, Titan
Referred for Prosecution, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at A18; D. Michaels,
Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems
with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1031 (2004) (noting that private
contractors have been running private interrogation centers with some affiliation
with the CIA was apparently the standard approach in Afghanistan).
219 Major Eric J. Lawless, The Secrets ofAbu Ghraib Revealed: American Soldiers
on Trial, 2011 Army Law 58 (2011) (book review).
2 20 Id. at 58.
221 Anderson, supra note 92, at 59-61.
222 See supra Part II(D).
223 William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1,
90(1973).
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duty." 224 If individuals are instructed to execute illegal mandates,
one can contest that the subordinate should have disregarded orders,
but is it reasonable to expect that MPs, in a combat zone, should be
placed in such a precarious situation by high-level zealots issuing
orders in violation of the Geneva Conventions and human rights
law? Frankly, even if soldiers acted discretionarily or perpetrated
conduct that was not per se approved, those actions might still be the
foreseeable consequences of top-level orders for interrogation that
contained sufficiently specific acts that violated the Geneva Conven-
tion. How can any MPs be punished without all of the evidence of
directives and an assessment of the culpability of all of those top
officials who issued orders? Nonetheless, this is specifically what
happened.
IV. RESULT OF ABU GHRAIB
A. Criminal Punishment
Twenty-seven military and intelligence officials were impli-
cated in the abuse.225 Eleven soldiers were punished, with the most
serious penalties imposed on Charles Graner, who was sentenced to
ten years in prison; Staff Sergeant Frederick, who was sentenced to
eight years; Lynndie England, who was sentenced to three years;
and nine other low-level individuals were court-martialed or
226
received short prison sentences. The troops who were punished
with court-martial or conviction were enlistees,227 while superiors
such as Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, Colonel Thomas Pappas,
and Captain Donald Reese received non-criminal penalties.228 The
224 Id. at 98.
225 Fay Report, supra note 43, at 109.
226 Brenner, supra note 7, at 68; Adam Zagorin, The Abu Ghraib Cases; Not Yet
Over, TIME, (Aug. 29, 2007), available at http://www.time.contime/politics/
article/0,8599,1656906,00.html.
227 Hillman, supra note 186, at 3.
228 James W. Smith III, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghrabi Courts-Martial
and the Failure of the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 723-24
(2006). Karpinski was censured, suspended from duty, and demoted to colonel,
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Bush Administration asserted that justice was served because the
perpetrators acted without orders. 229
While the defense was rebuffed by the court, Graner con-
tended that he was acting on orders from superiors to "soften up"
detainees, that he complied with "a general command climate of
humiliating detainees in the belief that humiliation would make
them more likely to reveal information of intelligence value,"230
adhered to directives of PMCs and military intelligence opera-
tives,23 and asserted that he believed the actions were approved
because a JAG officer witnessed the actions and did not voice
opposition.232 Because the Bush Administration issued interrogation
orders in violation of the Geneva Convention and there were
specific directives from Rumsfeld and Miller for Abu Ghraib, and
interrogators were carrying out the Bush Administration's illegal
orders and involving MPs, 233 Graner's argument is not illogical.
and she retired from the service. ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 336; John Hagan,
Gabrielle Ferrales & Guillermina Jasso, Collaboration and Resistance in the
Punishment of Torture in Iraq: A Judicial Sentencing Experiment, 28 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 1, 14 (2010).
229 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 104. WALDEN BELLO,
DILEMMAS OF DOMINATION 64 (2005); Full Text: Rice Defends US Policy, BBC,
Dec. 5, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4500630.stm (noting that
National Security Advisor Rice maintained that "the United States has vigorously
investigated, and where appropriate, prosecuted and punished those responsible.").
230 U.S. v. Graner, U.S. Ct. of Apps for the Armed Forces, No. 09-0432, at 4 (June
25, 2010), available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/opinions/2009
SepTerm/09-0432.pdf (court denying the request to reconsider evidence of
purported orders).
231 Candiotti & Polk, supra note 159.
232 GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 81, at 167.
233 ACLU lawyer Amrit Singh accentuated that government documents and
investigations indicated that "torture and abuse of detainees was routine and was
considered acceptable practice by US soldiers." McCoY, supra note 28, at 176-77.
See also Van Bergen & Valentine, supra note 207, at 453; Karpinski: Conspiracy
Behind Iraq Prison Abuse, Assoc. PREss, (Aug. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,127873,00.html (stating that Karpinski
disclosed that officials had been planning and discussing interrogation procedures,
excluding her from meetings, and trying to "ensure that [she] would not have
access to those facilities" and would remain uninformed; and that those officials
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Professor Davis called the lack of punishment for higher
level officials the "'different spanks for different ranks' problem." 234
High-level military officers are very unlikely to be subject to
judicial punishments, but could be reprimanded or demoted,
whereas those who actually execute orders have a higher likelihood
of receiving more severe punishment.235 Professor Bacevich, a
veteran of the Vietnam War and 1991 Gulf War, explained that "a
Pentagon file clerk who misplaces a classified document faces stiffer
penalties than a defense secretary whose arrogant recklessness
consumes thousands of lives."236 Professor Elizabeth Hillman
emphasized soldiers believe "that officers are insulated against
prosecution for wrongdoing by the political experience of pushing
blame to the lowest possible level, where it does not reflect as
poorly on the judgment of military and civilian leaders."237 Perhaps,
in the case of Abu Ghraib, soldiers were punished for getting caught
or for causing the Bush White House to look bad. Or, ironically
enough, the offensive scandal may have actually made the Bush
Administration look better than it would have ultimately appeared,
"but for" the episode.
knew what was happening and were embroiled in a conspiracy that probably
reached up to the White and Pentagon). See generally supra Parts II(D), III(A)(D).
234 Davis, supra note 177, at 516; Edward T. Pound, Unequal Justice, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, (Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://www.usnews.coni
usnews/news/articles/021216/16justice.htm.
235 Davis, supra note 177, at 549-50, 560 ("lower-level persons find themselves in
a terribly difficult situation where they fear being 'thrown under the bus' if a
public outcry occurs."); Brenner, supra note 7, at 36 (drawing parallels with the
My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War, in which top officials in the White
House and Pentagon used Lt. William Calley as a scapegoat to prevent scrutiny of
the war).
236 ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE END OF AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM 88 (2008).
237 Hillman, supra note 186, at 2-3 (further noting that "[o]thers attribute the low
number of officer court-martials to the generally good behavior of officers or to
the legal and political barriers to punishing individuals for acts that they did not
themselves commit, notwithstanding the doctrine of command responsibility.").
154
The Abu Ghraib Convictions
B. Propaganda Effect
It is true that the Bush White House attempted to conceal
and prevent the Abu Ghraib scandal and the depth of wrongdoing
from being publicized, 238 denied that detail was known,239 delayed
the public release of reports on the atrocities, 240 and selectively held
secret the more egregious images, 241 but one can even contend that
238 ARNOVE, supra note 24, at 24; IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at
9, 68.
239 Members of Congress were openly skeptical when Rumsfeld testified before
Congress on May 7, 2004, and alleged that he knew nothing about the depraved
activities and that "no one in the Pentagon had seen [the photos] .... [S]omebody
just sent a secret report to the press, and there they are." Hersh, supra note 109.
Skeptical Congresspersons were correct; there was previous knowledge because it
was subsequently divulged that the whistleblower, Sergeant Joseph Darby,
delivered a CD containing thousands of sexually explicit photographs of prisoners
to the Army's Criminal Investigation Division on January 13, 2004. Wallach,
supra note 102, at 546; Hersh, supra note 109. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) General
Richard Myers testified that a few days after the photos were handed over to Army
investigators, the information was given "to me and the Secretary up through the
chain of command .... And the general nature of the photos, about nudity, some
mock sexual acts and other abuse, was described." Hersh, supra note 109.
240 The Pentagon possessed the images in mid-January, four months prior to the 60
Minutes telecast, and the ICRC prepared an official report for the White House in
February 2004, making at least partial publication of the atrocities inevitable.
ARNOVE, supra note 24, at 23; Hersh, supra note 111; Hersh, supra note 109. JCS
Myers reportedly urged CBS to delay the telecast for an additional two weeks.
Gary Younge and Julian Borger, CBS Delayed Report on Iraqi Prison Abuse After
Military Chiefs Plea, THE GUARDIAN, (May 4, 2004), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/may/04/Iraqandthemedia.broadcasting.
241 Hersh, supra note 109 (noting that the Taguba Report discussed more
unreleased video and photographic files that were even more offensive than those
revealed by 60 Minutes). Some of those additional photos, which were released in
2006, involved images of a man with a slit throat, prisoners with burns, men
forced to masturbate in front of guards, and other heinous acts, but the U.S. media
virtually slighted the new photos. M. Angela Buenaventura, Presidential Power:
Article and Poetry: Torture in the Living Room, 6 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUsT. 103, 121-
22 (2007). The Bush Administration sought to prevent public disclosure of
Darby's disc under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), contending that doing so would
result in an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" of the victims, but Judge
Hellerstein discarded the argument. ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 64 (2d.
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having so much attention fixed on Abu Ghraib distracted scrutiny
from more egregious crimes, 242 such as ordering what many called
an illegal war of aggression. 243 Had the striking images of naked
Iraqis at Abu Ghraib not surfaced, perhaps more public attention
would have been placed on the question of an illegal war.244
Without a legal justification for invasion, it is unclear how any
exonerating explanation can exist for detaining, interrogating, or
- 245
abusing anyone.
With the infamy at Abu Ghraib, academics, the media, and
politicians began deliberating the proper standards for occupation
and for conducting interrogations that would not be torture, even
Cir. 2008); Kreimer, supra note 84, at 1206-07; ACLU v. Dept. of Def., 389 F.
Supp. 2d 547, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Court battles lingered over the release of
additional photos into the new administration, and President Obama remarked:
"Releasing these photos would inflame anti-American opinion and allow our
enemies to paint U.S. Troops with a broad, damning, and inaccurate brush, thereby
endangering them in theaters of war." Remarks by the President on National
Security, WHITE HOUSE, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09.
242 The sequence of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reports, the CIA's
Iraqi Survey Group investigation during the occupation and other investigations
concluded that Iraq had no connection to 9/11 or al Qaeda, and did not possess
WMDs. Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 20, at 875-82. The
first installment of those reports was released several weeks after the Abu Ghraib
story aired. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, S.
REP. No. 108-301 (July 7, 2004). The Bush Administration had tasked officials
with operations intended to displace the Iraqi regime from its first days in office,
which was revealed several months before Abu Ghraib broke, and made hundreds
of false statements about WMDs. Bejesky, Politico, supra note 22, at 33-34, 62-65.
243 Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 18, at 348-50.
244 Robert Bejesky, National Security Information Flow: From Source to
Reporter's Privilege, 24 ST. THOMAs L. REv. 399, 431-34 (2012) [hereinafter
Bejesky, Flow] (noting that media processes and cognitive processes can displace
older scandalous events with new as time passes).
245 Debate: "Will Hussein Get a Fair Trial," 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 21, 23-
24 (2006/2007) (recognizing that the barbarity at Abu Ghraib was merely an
outcome of an invasion that killed troops and civilians, demolished cities, and
wasted American taxpayer funds, and that troops executing questionable opera-
tions during an illegal and oppressive occupation, must all be observed within the
context of an invasion that undeniably violated international law).
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though any form of interrogation that is coercive is prima facie
illegal under Article 17 of the Geneva Conventions246 and the acts of
interrogation that the Bush Administration approved ostensibly
violated U.S. statutes. 247 The discourse was a bait-and-switch and
akin to stating, "Watch the abuse of the nude Iraqi over here and
ignore the illegal war, Geneva Convention rules that prohibit
interrogation without exception, injustices that were purportedly not
quite torture, and the fact that MPs were committing crimes akin to
what the Bush Administration approved for interrogators." There
was likely cognitive dissonance in that supermajorities of Americans
believe that it is illegal to use abusive interrogations, 248 but that
exceptions might be warranted if it could prevent a terrorist
attack.249 The Bush Administration adamantly rejected the turpitude
246 Geneva I, supra note 47, art. 17. The foreign media was much more
condemnatory of the abuse at Abu Ghraib than the American media. Strauss,
supra note 39, at 1274 (noting that the American media frequently presented the
accounts as "abusive" while foreign media usually utilized the word "torture").
247 See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) ("torture [is] any act, directed against an individual in the offender's
custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering ... whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual"). The Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 states that "[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation-(1) subjects an individual to
torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual." Id.
248 WorldPublicOpinion.org, World Public Rejects Torture, June 24, 2008,
available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/junO8/WPOTorture
JunO8_pr.pdf (noting that 53% of Americans believed that torture should be
banned under all circumstances); Jonathan Marcus, Heated Debate Over Use of
Torture, BBC, (Oct. 19, 2006, 6:16 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/6063800.stm (finding that 59% of people throughout the world oppose
torture); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the "War on Terrorism," 1
J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & PoL'Y 285, 287 (2005) ("Legal experts, foreign leaders,
and journalists rose in chorus to condemn the apparent approval of torture"). For
specific techniques that were approved or regularly practiced but are ostensibly
more extreme or vivid, 79% of Americans thought chaining prisoners down and
forcing them to be naked was wrong, 69% believe threats with dogs was wrong,
and 82% said waterboarding was wrong. Scheppele, supra, at 292 n.17.
249 Evan Thomas & Michael Hirsh, The Debate Over Torture, NEWSWEEK, Nov.
21, 2005, at 26 (noting that 58% of Americans believed that torture was justified
to prevent a terrorist attack); Strauss, supra note 39, at 1284 (many Americans,
Congress, and top Administration officials ignored the stories of abuse). In a
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committed by a few "bad apple" MPs at Abu Ghraib as anathema to
American values, but approved of similar interrogation techniques
and kept maintaining that interrogation was necessary to prevent
terrorism.25 0 Terrorism, by definition, targets civilians,251 and
American civilians were not being threatened by prisoners in Iraq.
Ultimately, despite the public revulsion resulting from the
Abu Ghraib scandal, there were no serious ramifications for the
Bush Administration; officials supported the conviction and punish-
ment of individual soldiers for acts at Abu Ghraib while continuing
to use the "support the troops" slogan to gamer positive views about
operations in Iraq252 and apparently continued the orders for
interrogation,253 which is particularly surprising given other events
in Iraq that were related to interrogation and occurred at about the
same time that the Abu Ghraib scandal broke.
November 2001 poll, 32% of Americans agreed that it would be lawful to use
interrogation methods that could be torture. See Luban, supra note 68, at 1425-26.
The percentage that felt torture was acceptable in some situations rose to 35% two
months after the release of the Abu Ghraib pictures. McCoY, supra note 28, at
151. Others would allow torture if a judge or jury would assess that it was
absolutely necessary. John T. Perry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected
Terrorists: Should Torture be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 743, 766 (2002).
250 Similarly, the television portrayal may dilute realistic perceptions of alleged
threats. Scholars, the Supreme Court, the Intelligence Science Board, and the dean
of West Point expressed that television shows, such as 24 and their tactics of using
torture to gain information from detainees was negatively influencing societal
perceptions and inexperienced interrogators with depraved lessons. John Ip, Two
Narratives of Torture, 7 Nw. U.J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 35, 75 (2009). Such
hypothetical portrayals can inveigle society to permit torture when they would
otherwise entirely reject it. Luban, supra note 68, at 1440-41; Buenaventura, supra
note 241, at 103 ("[F]ictional portrayals of torture on television mislead the
American public as to the true nature of torture, thereby obscuring the public
debate and diminishing the public pressure to hold those guilty of torture
accountable.").
251 Bejesky, CFP, supra note 17, at 15.
252 See Bejesky, Political Penumbras, supra note 194, at 48-52.
253 McCoY, supra note 28, at 166 (noting that in December 2004, the Senate voted
96 to 2 to ban all U.S. intelligence agencies from engaging in torturous acts, but
White House pressure and Republican Senators blocked attempts to outlaw CIA
interrogation methods and extraordinary rendition). See generally Bejesky, Call
for Papers, supra note 88, at 65-70; Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 6, at 823-28.
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C. More Egregious Accounts
The Abu Ghraib photographs principally exposed psycholo-
gical abuse that was considerably similar to the enumerated
approaches that the Bush Administration approved for interroga-
tors.254 However, because some of these acts at Abu Ghraib
ostensibly exceeded authorized interrogation methods and because
even more flagrant offenses were reported, one might opine that
personnel conducting interrogations and holding detainees were
disposed to overstepping authorized directives. Once illegalities are
recognized as frequently occurring and deemed ulta vires, perhaps
top officials in Washington should comprehend that they have
heightened obligations to implement measures to impede future
misdeeds in US facilities. Moreover, canvassing cases in which
troops, intelligence officials, or interrogators undoubtedly exceeded
authority, make the arguably lesser outrages depicted on 60 Minutes
appear all the more foreseeable. Consider some examples.
On November 28, 2003, the Pentagon announced that Iraqi
Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush died from "natural
causes," 255 but the Denver Post investigated and obtained a court
order to open previously classified documents and discovered that
Mowhoush had been stuffed alive into a sealed bag and beaten to
256death. A military autopsy was released and revealed that
254 See supra Parts II.D.2 and II.D.3 (noting general categories of interrogation
that were authorized for Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan, including using
isolation, stress position, phobias, harsh and day-long interrogations, perceptions
of drowning and suffocation, environmental manipulation, dietary restrictions, and
nudity; and the general orders to have interrogators at Abu Ghraib work with
MPs).
255 Michael Howard, Ex-Iraqi General Dies in US Custody, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
28, 2003, 8:21 PM), available at http://www.theguardian.com/word/2003/nov/28/
iraq.michaelhoward; Peter A. Clark, Medical Ethics at Guantanamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib: The Problem of Dual Loyalty, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 570, 573 (2006)
(surgeon stating that he died of natural causes).
256 McCoY, supra note 28, at 144-45. Other death certificates in Afghanistan were
falsified. Clark, supra note 255, at 573. It was not just US authorities who were
involved in egregious abuses. British troops detained the father of Mr. Baha
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Mowhoush died of suffocation and "blunt force trauma" during CIA
and Special Forces interrogations.257 Mowhoush was apparently
unresponsive to U.S. interrogations, and some combination of CIA,
Special Forces, and Army personnel apparently employed this
smothering technique to intensify pressure.258 The former comman-
der, Colonel David A. Teeples, testified that this "claustrophobic
technique" was an "approved and effective" interrogation method
used before and after Mowhoush's death.259
One month after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, media
revealed that Delta Force was operating a facility for "Iraqi
insurgents and suspected terrorists," which was the "scene of the
most egregious violations of the Geneva Convention."260 Manadel
al-Jamadi was discovered dead in a shower stall, hanging suspended
from a rope, with hands cuffed behind his back, broken rips, and a
brutally beaten face.261 An interrogator explained that al-Jamadi
Mousa and he was "brutally beaten by British troops" and killed. Al-Skeini v.
Sec'y State Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [6].
257 McCoY, supra note 28, at 144; Clark, supra note 253, at 573 (stating that
"Mowhoush's head was pushed into a sleeping bag while interrogators sat on his
chest").
258 Christopher A. Britt, The Commissioning Oath and the Ethical Obligation of
Military Officers To Prevent Subordinates from Committing Acts of Torture, 19
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 551, 551-52, 561 (2006).
259 McCoY, supra note 28, at 145; Britt, supra note 258, at 552.
260 Campbell Brown, New front in Iraq Detainee Abuse Scandal?, NBC NEWS,
(May 20, 2004, 8:10 PM), available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5024068/;
U.S. Admits to Secret Interrogation Site in Baghdad, CNN, (May 21, 2004, 6:37
PM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/05/21/iraq.main/
index.html (acknowledging the secret interrogation site, contending that it was
being run consistent with the Geneva Conventions, and noting "[t]hat's not to say
somebody didn't get their head dunked.").
261 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 82-83. Guards explained that
blood gushed from his mouth like a "faucet had been turned on." Seth Hettena,
Iraqi Died While Hanging by His Wrists, Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 18, 2005, available
at http://www.heraldtribune.coniarticle/20050218/NEWS/502180362. A photo-
graph surfaced of one of al-Jamadi, a "ghost detainee," who was surrounded by
US soldiers grinning and brandishing a "thumbs up" gesture. IN THE NAME OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 82; ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 411; Hettena,
supra.
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11 ,262
"was not cooperating, and he evidently died from asphysiation
during interrogation.263 The Pentagon and CIA asserted that al-
Jamadi was already in poor health when received by interrogators
and died while being interrogated by a CIA officer in November
2003 .264
There are other accounts. In November 2003, 39-year-old
Huda Alazawi, and her two brothers, Mu'taz and Ayad, were
captured and interrogated in a US detention facility. Guards threw
Ayad's dead body into Huda's cell, and the US military issued a
death certificate claiming the death was caused by "cardiac arrest of
unknown etiology," while later-released photographs of the body
265
exhibited extensive bruising and a severe head wound. Major
John M. Hackel reiterates the accounts of detainees that emerged at
about the same time that the infamy at Abu Ghraib was spotlighted,
but was virtually ignored: "Soldiers took two bound detainees, cut
their restraints, handed them inoperable assault rifles, and killed
262 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 82-83; Hettena, supra note
261.
263 Buenaventura, supra note 241, at 129-30.
264 DEPT. OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY CRIM. INVESTIGATION COMMAND, CID
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 240, (Oct. 16, 2004), available at http://www.
aclu.org/files/projects/foiasearch/pdf/DODDOACID009482.pdf; Andrea Mitchell,
Delta Force, Navy SEALs involved in abuse? NBC NEWS, (May 6, 2004, 6:15
PM), available at http://www.nbcnews.conid/4917567/ (CIA interrogator stating
that al Jamadi was "injured before he was turned over to the CIA"); Hersh, supra
note 44 (noting that CIA and military intelligence officials fought over who should
"dispose of the body," and they attempted to remove the corpse from the prison on
a stretcher with a fake IV attached to his arm so that al-Jamadi did not appear in
the prison's files). The news headlines suggested that Delta Force and Navy
SEALs could have been involved, and former CIA officer Robert Baer speculated
that there could have been a more intricate connection to the atrocities for which
MPs were being blamed: "I can't believe that those MPs knew enough about Arab
culture to systematically do this .... Somebody prompted them." Mitchell, supra.
265 Luke Harding, After Abu Ghraib, GUARDIAN Sept. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/20/usa.iraq. As General Miller was
escorting journalists through Abu Ghraib prison, Huda Alazawi shouted: "You are
the killers. This is our country. You have invaded it." Id. Shortly after the Abu
Ghraib scandals emerged and investigations of U.S. prison facilities were being
conducted, Huda was unexpectedly released after eight months of detainment. Id.
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them, claiming that the detainees had attempted to flee."266 Amjed
Isail Waleed was another prisoner at Abu Ghraib who had been
tortured, humiliated, and subject to sexual abuses.267 An Iraqi going
by the name "Saleh" was detained at Abu Ghraib and was beaten,
subjected to electric shocks, and forced to engage in sexual acts, but
268he was not even a loyalist of the former regime.
The Bush Administration did not authorize interrogation
techniques that should have resulted in detainee deaths, although
advice from legal advisors seemed to discombobulate the connection
among the government's interrogation orders, definitions of torture,
and culpability for perpetrating torture.269 These more atrocious
examples demonstrate that it should be expected that detention and
interrogation practices can intensify and that there were an
assortment of criminal acts that transpired during interrogations that
should impose a much higher level of culpability on interrogators
than on those who issued orders. Yet most of the depictions on 60
Minutes represent the reverse circumstance-those who committed
acts that were tantamount to the variety of interrogation methods
that were explicitly authorized by the White House and secretary of
defense should not be held as culpable as those who issued interro-
gation directives in violation of international law. Despite the
virtually unanimous condemnation and demands for responsibility
across the US government, from Congress, within the human rights
266 Major John Hackel, Planning for the "Strategic Case": A Proposal to Align
the Handling of Marine Corps War Crimes Prosecutions with Counterinsurgency
Doctrine, 57 NAVAL L. REV. 239, 255 (2009).
267 Carney, supra note 216, at 319. See also Fay Report, supra note 43, at 66
(highlighting an ICRC report of an abuse detainee who was held "in a totally
darkened cell, measuring about 2 meters long, and less than a meter across, devoid
of any window, latrine or water tap, or bedding," and noting that a sign was
attached that called the prisoner "Gollum" and included an image of the character
from the Lord of the Rings movie).
268 Roger Doyle, Comment, Contract Torture: Will Boyle Allow Private Military
Contractors to Profit from the Abuse of Prisoners?, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 467,468 (2007).
269 Bejesky, Callfor Papers, supra note 88, at 48-70.
162
The Abu Ghraib Convictions
community, and from the international community, 270 investigations
did not reflect a consistent theory of culpability, which makes the
assessment of liability on MPs glaringly deficient.
D. Multiple Investigations
1. Calls for Responsibility
The Bush Administration avowed that wrongdoing would be
271 --investigated, but instead frustrated investigations, relied on amen-
able Congresspersons to terminate inquiries, 272 and later insisted that
270 McCoy, supra note 28, at 146 (noting that on May 10, 2004, by a vote of 92-0,
the U.S. Senate called for "a full accounting for the cruel and disgraceful abuse of
Iraqi detainees," but a full accounting was never forthcoming); Sandeep Gopalan,
Alternative Sanctions and Social Norms in International Law: The Case of Abu
Ghraib, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 785, 826 (2007) (citing Programme Management
Note, African Hum. Rts. And Access to Just. Programme (Int'l Comm'n of
Jurists), May 2004, at 1) (citing members of the international human rights
community, the International Commission of Jurists expressed deep concern over
the reports of systematic human rights abuses at Abu Ghrabi, and designated them
"sadistic, wanton and criminal abuses" and "obscene" and "shocking" torture). See
generally Neil MacFarquhar, Arab Meeting Expected to Produce Mostly Criticism
of U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A3; Alan Cowell, Powell, on Trip to
Mideast, Vows Justice on Iraq Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, at A18; Thomas
L. Friedman, Editorial, Restoring Our Honor, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at A35
(contending that Bush should have apologized for what happened at Abu Ghraib at
a meeting of world leaders). Then-Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist explained that
"[w]hat we saw is appalling." Charles Babington, Lawmakers Are Stunned By
New Images of Abuse, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22464-2004Mayl2.html.
Representative Jane Harman contended: "I saw cruel, sadistic torture." Babington,
supra at A01. Senator Saxby Chambliss stated: "My stomach gave out." Kathy
Kiely & William M. Welch, Abu Ghraib Photos Cause Gasps in Congress, USA
TODAY, May 13, 2004, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.connews/world/
iraq/2004-05-12-congress-abuse x.htm.
271 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 110.
272 Eric Schmitt, Congress's Inquiry into Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners Bogs Down,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/16/
world/reach-war-capitol-hill-congress-s-inquiry-into-abuse-iraqi-prisoners-bogs-
down.html; Abu Ghraib, Stonewalled, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2004, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/30/opinion/abu-ghraib-stonewalled.html (noting
2013-14 163
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vol. XXXII
the media's fixation on accounts of human rights abuses, were
motivated by "political animus and misinformation." 273 In Senate
confirmation hearings in January 2005, Gonzales remarked that he
regretted and condemned the abuses at Abu Ghraib and informed
that assessing accountability was the reason for court-martials and
274
administrative penalties. Gonzales himself was not held respon-
sible, despite that he was approving of the illegal tactics, and instead
the Republican Congress approved of him as the chief prosecutor in
the country.275
Government reports, human rights investigations, court
documents, journalist accounts, media articles, and victim state-
ments substantiated a long list of torture crimes,276 and numerous
- 277investigations did result in disciplinary or criminal proceedings.
that the White House "obstructed investigations," the Pentagon removed 2,000 of
the 6,000 pages relating to interrogation techniques in Iraq, and Rumsfeld claimed
that providing information to Congress violated "Red Cross confidentiality poli-
cies" to turn over IRC reports even when the IRC officially stated many times that
the reports should be given to Congress). As with eagerly authorizing the use of
force against Iraq when there was no security threat and the rejection of bringing
troops home when Americans opposed the war, the Republican-controlled
Congress did very little to end interrogation abuses. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note
6, at 887-90; Bejesky, Political Penumbras, supra note 194, at 14, 45-46.
273 Kreimer, supra note 84, at 1194.
274 Id. at 163 (citing Senate Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing Transcript
5, 12, 19, January 6, 2005).
275 Bejesky, Callfor Papers, supra note 88, at 4-5, 64-66.
276 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 68, 84; HuMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 25. Starting in October 2003, the ACLU, along with Center
for Constitutional Rights, Physicians for Human Rights, Veterans for Common
Sense, and Veterans for Peace, began filing FOIA requests and by early-2005 and
attained 1,200 pages of documents relating to prisoner abuse. ACLU, supra note
107; Charlie Savage, Files Suggest US Troops Tried to Hide Abuses, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2005, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/
washington/articles/2005/02/18/files suggest us-troops-tried to hide abuses/.
277 John R. Crook, U.S. Military Justice Proceedings Involving Alleged Offenses
Against Protected Persons, 99 A.J.I.L. 713, 713 (2005) (noting that an Army
report stated that 125 personnel had been administratively sanctioned or court-
martialed). The Pentagon investigated over five hundred cases of alleged detainee
abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan and 251 disciplinary or criminal proceedings had
been brought against military personnel. Eric Schmitt, Army Interrogator Is
Convicted ofNegligent Homicide in 2003 Death of Iraqi General, N.Y. TIMES Jan.
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By 2009, the Department of Defense adopted fourteen different
investigative reports of detainee abuse, and Abu Ghraib became one
of the most investigated government abuse scandals since
Watergate.278
2. Pentagon Investigations
The Ryder Report was the first official report produced on
prisoner abuse in U.S. detention facilities. 279 Major General Ryder,
the Army Provost Marshall, reviewed detainment facilities in Iraq
during October and November 2003 and explained that "[g]enerally,
conditions in existing prisons, detention facilities and jails meet
minimum standards of health, sanitation, security, and human rights
established by the Geneva Conventions." 280 Perhaps the worst
abuses did not surface prior to this investigation. Consequently, four
heavily publicized investigations followed-the Taguba, Fay/Jones,
Mikolashek, and Schlesinger reports.281 The Taguba and the
Fay/Jones reports concentrated on the Abu Ghraib atrocities, while
the Schlesinger and Mikolashek investigations involved broader
inquiries. 282 The Mikolashek and Fay/Jones reports provided only
minimal sourcing for assertions, while the Schlesinger report
provided almost no sourcing for its conclusions.283
The Taguba investigation concluded that "several US Army
Soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave breaches of
international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq." 284
23, 2006, at A17; Josh White, Former Abu Ghraib Guard Calls Top Brass
Culpable for Abuse, WASH. POST, JAN. 23, 2006, at A3.
278 Rohman, supra note 203, at 97, 101.
279 ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 383.2 80 MAJOR GENERAL DONALD RYDER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF
THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL, REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 7 (November 2003), available at http://www.dodig.mil/
Foia/ERR/06-INTEL-10-part%202.pdf.
281 Rohman, supra note 203, at 102.
282 Id. at 104-05.
283 Id. at 121 (stating that the Taguba Report was more thorough in substantiating
findings).
284 Taguba Report, supra note 73, at 50.
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The Fay/Jones inquiry also countenanced the "few bad apples
explanation" by attributing culpability to a "small group of morally
corrupt soldiers and civilians" who lacked discipline.285 The MPs
possessed "criminal propensities" and lacked a solid understanding
of MP responsibilities for interrogation operations, which were
shortcomings abetted by leadership failures, multiple-agency over-
lap of operations at Abu Ghraib, and languid management of
contractorS286 and Army failure to prevent the CIA interrogators'
violation of rules applicable to US military detention facilities. 287
The Fay and Jones reports determined that the highest levels of
government assumed that detainees could be forcefully treated, 288
but refrained from assessing affirmative responsibility on the highest
levelS 289 and discerned that a massive diffusion of responsibility
among fifty people contributed to misconduct at Abu Ghraib.290
Another interpretation is that if fifty people were involved,
there were fifty opportunities to prevent the wrongs. It seems
unlikely that dozens of individuals could all concomitantly founder
285 MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE R. FAY & LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTHONY R.
JONES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU
GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE, at
Executive Summary 2-3 (2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nationi/documents/fay-report 8-25-04.pdf [hereinafter Jones/Fay Report].
286 ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 393; Jones/Fay Report, supra note 285, at 4-6;
Jones Report, supra note 76, at 18 ("the primary cause of the most egregious
violent and sexual abuses was the individual criminal propensities of the particular
perpetrators."). see Schooner, supra note 215, at 557.
287 The Army allowed CIA interrogators to move freely about the facility and to
"house 'ghost detainees' who were unidentified and unaccounted for in Abu
Ghraib," which was a corrupting mystique that "eroded the necessity [of the MPs]
... to follow Army rules." McCoY, supra note 28, at 154-56; Fay Report, supra
note 43, at 7-9, 29, 42, 44, 45, 53, 55, 118; Scheppele, supra note 248, at 318
("[S]oldiers who witnessed what the CIA was allowed to do in the middle of the
same 'war on terrorism' may have been tempted to believe that they could do the
same.").
288 Jones Report, supra note 76, at 8-9.
289 Id. at 15-16 (affirming "These incidents of physical or sexual abuse are serious
enough that no soldier or contractor believed the conduct was based on official
policy or guidance ... No policy, directive, or doctrine caused the violent or sexual
abuse incidents.")
290 Fay Report, supra note 43, at 7-8.
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on their obligations to engender the particular result unless some
superior authority impelled the wrongdoing into motion. Top offi-
cials did issue outrageous directives for interrogation when the
Article 17 of the Geneva Conventions states that no interrogations
of detainees may be conducted.291 Moreover, if the misconduct at
Abu Ghraib was principally attributable to poor judgments at the
lowest level, it is bewildering that more serious harms became
common across multiple detention facilities and that wrongs
continued long after the Abu Ghraib investigations.
In addition to the already discussed instances of more egre-
gious abuse that occurred due to interrogation and at about the same
time that the Abu Ghraib scandal occurred,292 by May 2004, at least
37 prisoner deaths in U.S. detention facilities had been investi-
gated.293 In many cases, Army investigators lost records, evidence
was contaminated, and autopsies were not taken.294 Army inspector
General Paul T. Mikolashek's 321-page report itemized 94 cases of
abuse, 39 deaths, and 20 murders.295 Mikolashek's First Finding
states: "All interviewed and observed commanders, leaders, and
soldiers treated detainees humanely," and that there was no systemic
or institutional causes for abuse.296 The methodical explanation was
that wrongdoers were soldiers who disregarded "Army Values."
297
291 Cf Geneva I, supra note 47, art. 17. See supra Part II(D)(2),(3) (issuing
abusive interrogations).
292 See supra Part IV(C).
293 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 82-83.294 Id. at 110.
295 John Hendren & Mark Mazzetti, Army Implicates 28 US Troops in Deaths of 2
Afghan Detainees, L.A. TIMEs, (Oct. 15, 2004), available at http://articles.latimes.
com/2004/oct/1 5/world/fg-defensel 5.
296 U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GEN, INSPECTION REPORT ON DETAINEE
OPERATIONS ii, 17 (2004), available at http://wwwl.unm.edu/humanrts/Oath
Betrayed/Mikolashek%20Report.pdf (stating that "[t]he DAIG did not identify a
systemic cause for the abuse incidents").
297 Id. at forward, ii-iv, 13, 15-16, 22, 31, 38, 90, E-8; id. at iii, 13 (further
rationalizing that the enemy did not obey the Geneva Conventions, which placed
soldiers in demanding and stressful conditions and required intelligence from
interrogations, and soldiers were frequently "attacked by detainees," "taunted or
spat upon," at risk of being infected by detainee diseases, and required to dodge
the "urine or feces" being thrown by detainees).
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The Milolashek Report assessed very limited responsibility, and
Professor Zimbardo explained that "[t]his top-level 'whitewash'
should be packaged with the Ryder Report as a Tweedledee-
Tweedledum boxed set." 298
The Schlesinger report did implicate the Bush Admini-
stration in wrongdoing for affirmatively rejecting being bound by
the Geneva Convention,299 and also stated that there were "confu-
sing and inconsistent interrogation technique policies," which
"contributed to the belief that additional interrogation techniques
were condoned."oo In April 2005, Lieutenant General Stanley E.
Green, the Army's inspector general, exonerated four out of the five
top Army officers who were criticized in previous reports.30 1 None
of the officials who authorized abusive practices for interrogations
were implicated.302
3. Reflections
Consider remarks by the Bush Administration shortly after
the Abu Ghraib stories broke. President Bush stated that the actions
in the "prison are abhorrent and they don't represent America," but
only "represent the actions of a few people."sos Three weeks later,
298 ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 383, 391 (noting that the New Yorker labeled the
Ryder Report "at best a failure and at worst a cover up").
299 IRONS, supra note 69, at 252; Benforado & Hanson, supra note 137, at 547.
300 Benforado & Hanson, supra note 137, at 548 (citing Schlesinger Report, supra
note 124, at 10). See Eric Schmitt, Abuse Panel Says Rules on Inmates Need
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 2004, at Al (Schlesinger postulating that it was
"'Animal House' on the night shift."). Tillie Fowler, a member of the committee
that produced the report and a former member of the House of Representatives,
determined that there were "fundamental failures throughout all levels of com-
mand ... from the soldiers on the ground to Central Command [in Iraq] and to the
Pentagon. These failures of leadership helped to set the conditions which allowed
the abusive practices to take place." IRONs, supra note 69, at 252-53.
301 Eric Schmitt, Four Top Officers Cleared by Army of Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.con2005/04/23/politics/23abuse.
html?pagewanted= 1 &_r-0.
302 McCoY, supra note 28, at 169.
303 Bush Vows Abusers Will Face Justice, CNN, (May 6, 2004), available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/05/05/bush.abuse/index.html.
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Bush contended that it was "disgraceful conduct by a few American
troops, who dishonored our country and disregarded our values." 30
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld affirmed that they were
"seeking a way to provide appropriate compensation to those
detained who suffered grievous and brutal abuse and cruelty at the
hands of a few members of the U.S. military."os Official accounts
denied that human rights violations were systematic, but instead
assumed that abusive acts were anomalies and aberrations.306 Those
issues were never resolved and apparently most Americans did not
accept the explanation. 30 7
Investigations conducted by high-ranking generals and
former top officials were not comprehensive, but were confined and
controlledsos and incorporated an innate conflict with military
personnel adverse to implicating their superiors and the White
House309 and did not interview victims or engage in queries up the
304 Transcript From Bush Speech on American Strategy in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, (May
24, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/24/politics/25PTEX-FULL.html?
pagewanted=all.
305 Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees (May 7, 2004), available at http://www.
defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid= 118.
306 Jesselyn Radack, Discussing a Taboo-A Review of Torture: A Collection, 14
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 609, 625 (2005).
307 Jill Taylor, Poll: Most Want Inquiry into Anti-terror Tactics, USA TODAY, Feb.
12, 2009, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-
02-11-investigation-pollN.htm (citing that even after President Obama entered
office and after all of the military reports, nearly two-thirds of Americans still
wanted an investigation into the Bush Administration's involvement in the
purported torture programs).
308 Rohman, supra note 203, at 44.
309 See Id. at 106; General David M. Brahms, et. al., Letter to President George W.
Bush, Sept. 7, 2004, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/
uploads/pdf/090108-ETN-sept7-mil-ldrs-ltr.pdf (group of military officials affir-
ming the limitations in such an investigation when they stated: "Investigations that
are purely internal to the military, however competent, cannot examine the whole
picture."). General Taguba later recalled that after he completed the report, he was
told that "you and your report will be investigated." Hersh, supra note 109. He
remarked: "I'd been in the Army thirty-two years by then, and it was the first time
that I thought I was in the Mafia." Id. After retiring in 2007, Taguba felt that he
had been "ostracized" for being "overzealous and disloyal." Id.
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chain of command.310 Members of Congress sparred over interpreta-
tions of the same reports in allocating blame. 1 The informal and
ambiguous chain of command and the multiple investigations,
theories, and individuals responsible, evidently contained culpability
such that together, everyone is responsible, but separately, there is
312diffusion of responsibility.
Despite that the "few bad apples" theory remained the Bush
313Administration's official response, scholars also did not believe
310 Rohman, supra note 203, at 18, 22-23 (stating that the Department of Defense
investigations relied on interviews with soldiers and officers, who were sometimes
summoned in groups and had their responses monitored, and did not interview
victims).
311 Eric Schmitt & Douglas Jehl, Army Says CIA Hid More Iraqis Than It
Claimed, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2004/09/10/politics/10abuse.html?_r=0. It is the same pattern played out
among the White House, CIA, Pentagon, Chalabi's INC, and the mainstream
media for the false information that manipulated Americans into an illegal war
with Iraq. see generally Bejesky, Politico, supra note 22. See generally Robert
Bejesky, Congressional Oversight of the "Marketplace of Ideas": Defectors as
Sources of War Rhetoric, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2012).
312 The finger-pointing and avoidance of responsibility for the Abu Ghraib scandal
and the sequence of prolonging a full account of wrongdoing, denying
responsibility, and making misrepresentations was similar to the pattern that
Britain followed when it got caught committing human rights atrocities and torture
during interrogation on Irish detainees in the early-1970s, which was a case
brought before the European Court of Human Rights. App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 25 (1980). McCoY, supra note 28, at 152; Martha Minow, Book
Review: What is the Greatest Evil?: The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of
Terror, 118 HARV L. REV. 2134, 2162 (2005). There were years of cover-ups until
Britain officially acknowledged before the world community that what they were
doing was illegal and that it would not happen again. See Bejesky, Utilitarian
Rational Choice, supra note 106, at 405-11.
313 Ragavan & Mireles, supra note 60, at 620; Katherine Gallagher, Efforts to
Hold Donald Rumsfeld and Other High-level United States Officials Accountable
for Torture, ICJ 7 5 (1087 (2009) (noting that investigations "did not look up the
chain of command"); Neil MacMaster, Torture: from Algiers to Abu Ghraib, 46
RACE & CLASS 1, 14 (2004) (stating that "Bush and Rumsfeld ... claimed
ignorance ... Implicit in such a discourse was the claim that there was no
systematic deployment of torture interrogation techniques in the US army and that
sadistic acts were isolated to degraded individuals and did not reach up through the
chain of command."); Philip Carter, The Road to Abu Ghraib, WASH. MONTHLY,
Nov. 2004, at 21. Neoconservative William Kristol, Editor of the conservative
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the explanation. David Luban stated: "Abu Ghraib is the fully
predictable image of what a torture culture looks like ... Abu Ghraib
,,314is not a few bad apples-it is the apple tree. Professor Mark
Drumbl explained that the "'few bad apples' theory is the official
story: namely, that a warped fringe group of individuals on the
night-shift at Abu Ghraib, acting independently, inflicted the
abuses."315 The Republican-controlled Congress responded "with a
combination of disingenuous disavowals, misleading direction, and
outright obstruction,"316 but after Democrats retook Congress, the
Senate Armed Services Committee explained that "the abuse of
detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions
of 'a few bad apples' acting on their own." 1 Perhaps hitting the
ratiocinative homerun, Yale Law Professor James Forman
explained: "[T]he alleged bad apples are not low-level officers but
Bush, Rumsfeld, and Cheney themselves."318
The final result appears to assume that the U.S., as a consti-
tutional democracy, can assess internal accountability, while power
prohibits international punishment and only leads to a shameful
temporary reputational defilement.319 When the evidence became
apparent, Rumsfeld deflected blame toward failure to prevent harms
Weekly Standard, made many media appearances and also insisted that the
conduct was caused by "a couple of extremely bad apples." Benforado & Hanson,
supra note 137, at 545; Strauss, supra note 39, at 1275 (noting that the
Administration's treatment of the abuse was to consider them a "sadistic renegade
group engaged in 'Animal House-type' behavior").
314 Luban, supra note 68, at 1452; John Barry et al., Abu Ghraib and Beyond,
NEWSWEEK, May 17, 2004, at 32 (Senator Lindsay Graham noting that "[t]his is
not a few bad apples. This is a system failure, a massive failure.").
315 Mark A. Drumbl, Guantanamo, Rasul, and the Twilight of Law, 53 DRAKE L.
REv. 897, 914 (2005).
316 Kreimer, supra note 84, at 1201.
317 Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody Before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, 110th Cong. xii (2008), available at http://www.
armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20FinalApril%
2022%202009.pdf.
318 James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make
the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 331, 338 (2009).
319 See Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 6, at 866-87. See also Grant & Keohane,
supra note 160, at 39.
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when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "I am
accountable for them and I take full responsibility," but no respon-
sibility or punishment was ever enforced on the top of the
government hierarchy. 320 It is true that Rumsfeld was on notice of
prisoner abuses before any of this transpired due to Red Cross
reports, human rights reports, and press accounts,321 but he not only
failed to curb abuses, but he approved of enumerated interrogation
methods that violated international war crimes, the Geneva
Convention, and the Convention against Torture.322 Rumsfeld
apologized for the wrong act.
Many commentators deemed the Pentagon investigations
inadequate. Keith Rohman, a professor and president of Public
Interest Investigations, Inc., explained that "time and time again,
high-visibility investigations of public scandals not only fail to
uncover truth, they seem to redirect the focus in the wrong direction.
The Department of Defense's (DoD) investigations of the detainee
abuse scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison are a recent example of
this."323 Professor Henry R. Luce emphasized that the investigations
were specifically designed to protect Bush Administration officials
from scrutiny, and that pivotal documents involving Administration
culpability remained hidden.324 Congressman David Obey con-
tended: "This could not have happened without people in the upper
echelon of the Administration giving signals. I just didn't see how
this was not systemic."325 Rear Admiral John D. Hutson explained:
"The investigations ... failed to address senior military and civilian
320 IRONS, supra note 69, at 253. See also Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Apology
in International Law and Diplomacy, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 448 (2006)
(Rumsfeld remarking: "[T]o those Iraqis who were mistreated by members of the
U.S. armed forces, I offer my deepest apologies.").
321 See ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 407. See also Pearlstein, supra note 12, at 1268
n.56.
322 See ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 407. See also Frontline: The Torture Question
(PBS television broadcast, Oct. 18, 2005), transcript available at http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/etc/script.html.
323 Rohman, supra note 203, at 96.
324 See IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 136-37.
325 Rohman, supra note 203, at 103.
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command responsibility and in doing so separate culpability from
responsibility."326
As Harvey Volzer, a lawyer for one of the accused low-level
soldiers, explained, "the higher up the [court-martials] go, the more
problems they have with people leading to the Pentagon ... Pappas
gives them Sanchez ... Sanchez can give them Rumsfeld ...
Rumsfeld can lead to Bush and Gonzales." 327 Even Schlesinger
admitted: "[T]he abuses were not just the failure of some individuals
to follow known standards, and they are more than the failure of a
few leaders to enforce proper discipline. There is both institutional
and personal responsibility at higher levels."328 In Getting Away
with Torture?, Human Rights Watch concluded that an independent
investigation was required and believed that responsibility should
extend up the government hierarchy to Rumsfeld and Tenet.329
V. CONCLUSION
Tens of thousands of Iraqi detainees were swept up in
dragnet procedures and imprisoned during a war that was carried out
without a valid justification and without Security Council authoriza-
326 id.
327 McCoY, supra note 28, at 168.
328 Schlesinger Report, supra note 124, at 5 (further noting that "[t]here is no
evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or military
authorities."). This is abysmally inaccurate claim. Douglas Jehl, A Trail of Major
Failures Leads to Defense Secretary's Office, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 2004,
available at http://www.nytimes.con2004/08/25/politics/25assess.html (noting
that responsibility extended to Rumsfeld's office and that "some of Mr.
Rumsfeld's critics have demanded his resignation"); Strauss, supra note 39, at
1275-76 (Pentagon report explaining that "culpability extended far beyond a
handful of low-level military police personnel, to include military intelligence
soldiers in Iraq and up the chain of command in the Persian Gulf to the highest
levels in Washington.")
329 See ZIMBARDO, supra note 8, at 403. See also Brenner, supra note 7, at 68.
(noting that former Army Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, Secretary of State Colin
Powell's former chief of staff, acknowledged that those in the chain of command
tolerated torture, higher level officials received immunity, and reiterated that the
president and vice president publicly admitted that they were taking the gloves
off).
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tion, but the Abu Ghraib prison turpitude sparked more media
scrutiny.s330 The attention shifted public perceptions from an illegal
war based upon false allegations about WMDs to vivid atrocities
and nude Iraqis piled on top of each other while surrounded by MPs
at Abu Ghraib. This was one key point during the Bush Admini-
stration's tenure, which might best be identified in terms as an era of
successively bursting scandal with wrongs that were each indepen-
dently condemnable, but each was displaced by something new.
Attention was redirected from previous actions, and outrage was
redirected to new wrongs. In the case of Abu Ghraib, there was
never a full accounting of chain of command responsibility as was
urged by experts, organizations, and the international community.
The Bush Administration authorized despicable psycholo-
gical interrogation methods across all detention facilities, and high-
level military officials discussed explicit orders for interrogation in
Iraq. Rumsfeld ordered Miller to implement harsh interrogation
practices in Iraq and Karpinski's MPs were instructed to participate
and assist interrogators in some capacity. Distinctions between
torture and cruel and unusual punishment are insignificant because
both are prohibited under Article 17 of the Geneva Conventions.
The Bush Administration and intelligence officials escaped punish-
ment for what transpired at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.332 Several
soldiers were blamed and faced punishment, but this selective
punishment was unjust.
Each of the Pentagon investigations offered a slightly
different causal combination to explain the injustices. The Associ-
ated Press explained that after several years of investigations, "no
officers or civilian leaders [were] held criminally responsible for the
prisoner abuse that embarrassed the U.S. military and inflamed the
330 See McCoY, supra note 28, at 172 (noting that the Washington Post and the
New York Times became avid truth seekers and conducted their own investigations
on interrogation abuse, and placed their findings on front pages).
331 Bejesky, Flow, supra note 244, at 430-34.
332 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 86, 260-71; HuMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 25.
333 Croessmann, supra note 117, at 947.
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Muslim world."334 There are fifty state attorney general's offices in
the U.S. and 193 UN member countries in the world that can
potentially investigate civil or criminal aspects of war crimes and
torture. 335 Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni adeptly summarized:
The patterns of deceit, command influence,
concealment, dereliction of duty to investigate and
prosecute, intentional disregard of legal obligations,
as well as elaborate schemes to evade the application
of the law, have been recognized in many cases of
criminal responsibility under Title 18 with respect to
conspiracy to commit white collar crimes and violent
crimes. Why the legal subterfuges ... have escaped
legal scrutiny, both within the military and civilian
systems of justice, has no other explanations except
for the fact that the operators of these two systems of
336justice have looked the other way.
334 Ben Nuckols, Military Prosecution in Abu Ghraib Scandal Ends, Assoc.
PRESS, Jan. 11, 2008, available at http://www.boston.connews/nation/articles/
2008/01/11/military-prosecution in abusghraib scandal ends/.
335 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J 58-61 (Feb. 14) (holding that universal
jurisdiction crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, can conflict
with the customary law of official immunity so to limit the jurisdiction of foreign
courts, and also referencing that the immunity holding applies to heads of state and
foreign ministers); STEPHEN MACEDO, ET AL., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 16 (2001) ("The principle of universal jurisdiction is
based on the notion that certain crimes are so harmful to international interests that
states are entitled-and even obliged-to bring proceedings against the
perpetrator, regardless of the location of the crime or the nationality of the
perpetrator or the victim."). See generally Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement
of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U.L. REV. 698 (2011) (emphasizing the ability of state
attorney general offices to enforce federal law in certain types of cases).
336 Bassiouni, supra note 207, at 418; Erwin Chemerinsky, Mary Ellen O'Connell &
Jeremy Rabkin, Spring 2010 Symposium-A Collision of Authority: The U.S.
Constitution and Universal Jurisdiction: A Symposium Transcript, 9 RICH. J. GLO-
BAL L. & BUS. 307, 314 (2010) (statement by Chemerinsky) (stating that the reason
why we are "talking about universal jurisdiction in February of 2010" is because
"individuals as the highest levels of American government violated American
international law and have not been held accountable in American courts").
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